

Implicatures and Inferences in Communication

Yrd. Doç. Dr. Korkut Uluç İşisağ



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Preface

As the notion of meaning being one of the most significant challenges in our era, it is crucial to shed light to it in order to make the communication process more effective. For this, two substantial subfields of linguistics, semantics and pragmatics, have come into use. When meaning is considered, not only the literal meaning of the words and sentences is adequate, but also the implied meanings have to be deduced with the help of contextual factors. In other words, context plays a vital role in communication and it falls under the domain of pragmatics which has come to the fore in recent decades.

In a conversation, interlocutors have significant tasks to undertake. The speaker has to organize his/her utterances by keeping in mind the background knowledge of the hearer and the shared assumptions between each other. Meanwhile, the hearer makes use of the context to grasp the intended meaning thoroughly. By its very nature, a conversation is a joint procedure that takes place between the interlocutors who are expected to obey to a principle called the cooperative principle and the conversational maxims.

However, the speaker does not always utter exactly what s/he means. In this case, the addressee must correctly interpret what the speaker wishes to convey so that the communication is carried out smoothly. In short, the speaker implies and the hearer infers. Based on this, the implicatures and the inferences play crucial roles in order to get the correct interpretations.

Therefore, the elaboration of the above mentioned topics is thought to clarify the distinction between what is said and what is meant by supplying various examples from everyday life. It is to be hoped that this book will help the people dealing with these topics.

Finally, I would like to thank my family, my friends and my colleagues who encouraged me and contributed to the study. I would also like to thank Pegem A Publishing which has been meticulous at every moment of the publication process.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Language is the most important feature that separates human beings from other living things. It is a means of communication that people use to engage in any kind of social interaction. People can express themselves whenever they want to do so. They can create a sentence by using any number of words and convey it to other people. Because people live in a society, they are constantly in need of communicating with each other to exchange ideas, meet their needs, share their thoughts, beliefs and values; in short, they have to be able to survive aptly. Thus, all the societies need a language to be able to sustain their existences as societies and to transfer their values from generations to generations as each and every individual needs it as well.

However, the language use in a society is not that simple, rather it is a very complex process. Although language and the use of language can well be perceived as a systematic ordering, on the first thought, this is not the case since people mostly use language when communicating with each other, which is a highly complicated procedure with multidimensional aspects. That is why the study of human communication has attracted the attention of many scholars interested in various disciplines, including semantics, pragmatics, discourse analysis, sociolinguistics, anthropology, and others. The basic and main function of communication is to convey attitudes, ideas, and feelings from the speaker to the hearer by means of language

(Ibrahim and Abbas, 2010:8). For this, it is necessary to make use of linguistics, which is a scientific discipline interested in researching and examining a language. Linguistics, an interdisciplinary science, embraces many branches of disciplines. In general, a language can be categorized into three subparts; form, meaning and use. When these subparts are connected to linguistics, it can be stated that phonology, morphology, and syntax take place under the heading “form”; for the second division, semantics mainly studies “the meaning”, however, meaning could be ascribed to pragmatics as well and the last part, “use”, is totally taken into account under pragmatics. For the use of a language, it is necessary that the sentences have a meaning, which is still not enough. Because the meaning of a sentence, or even the meaning of the same sentence may differ according to the context depending on various factors such as time, place, and social relationships between the interlocutors. That is why pragmatics, which forms one of the most important subdivisions of linguistics and examines the use of a language, is becoming increasingly important. So, Thomas (1995:22) refers to pragmatics as meaning in interaction, because the process of making meaning is a joint accomplishment between the speaker and the hearer. Based on this, meaning is not something which is inherent in the words alone, nor is it produced by the speaker nor by the hearer alone. Making meaning is a dynamic process, involving the negotiation of meaning between the interlocutors, the context of utterance and the potential meaning of an utterance created by the speaker.

For a conversation to occur, first of all, there have to be at least two interlocutors; the speaker and the hearer. Then, before they engage in the conversation, they greet each other and after this greeting, a post greeting comes. Within the flow of the conversation, the interlocutors take turns naturally. While doing this, they have to choose the most appropriate linguistic expression from their linguistic repertoires and, in this sense, the meaning in interaction gains importance since the meaning relies on context which is one of the key terms in pragmatics.

According to Spencer-Oatey and Zegarec (2002:74), the fundamental questions that pragmatics mainly deals with are the following:

- i. How do people communicate more than what the words or phrases of their utterances might mean by themselves, and how do people make these interpretations?
- ii. Why do people choose to say and/or interpret something in one way rather than another?
- iii. How do people's perceptions of contextual factors (for example, who the interlocutors are, what their relationship is, and what circumstances they are communicating in) influence the process of producing and interpreting language?

These questions form the major considerations within the scope of pragmatics. Additionally, some other features of pragmatics can be identified as the study of speaker meaning, contextual meaning and the study of how more gets communicated than is said (Yule, 1996:3). First of all, pragmatics is concerned with the study of meaning as communicated by a speaker and interpreted by a listener. It has, consequently, more to do with the analysis of what people mean by their utterances than what the words or phrases in those utterances might mean by themselves. So, it is the study of speaker meaning. Second, pragmatics necessarily involves the interpretation of what people mean in a particular context and how the context influences what is said. It requires a consideration of how speakers organize what they want to say in accordance with who they are talking to, where, when and under what circumstances. Therefore, it is the study of contextual meaning. And finally, pragmatics explores how listeners can make inferences about what is said in order to arrive at an interpretation of the speaker's intended meaning. This type of study explores how a great deal of what is unsaid is recognized as part of what is communicated.

People do not always explicitly say what they actually mean. What they intend to say may mean totally different from what they utter.

For example, when someone asks a question such as “*Is this your car?*”, the addressee might have difficulties in understanding the real message behind it. Possible interpretations of this simple question are such as the following and the list may be extended based on the intention of the speaker and the context:

- i. Your car is blocking my way.
- ii. It is really a nice car. Would you consider to sell it?
- iii. I have been thinking to buy one such as yours. Would you recommend it?
- iv. Could you give me a lift?

By looking at the example and the possible interpretations above, interesting concerns may arise as Thomas (1995:18) proposes; if speakers regularly mean something other than what they say, how is it, then, that people manage to understand one another? If a single group of words such as “*Is this your car?*” could mean so many different things at different times in different contexts and when uttered by different people with different intentions, how do people work out what it actually does mean on one specific occasion? And why don't people just say what they mean?

These are some questions that pragmatics seeks to answer. For instance, “*What did they mean by that?*” is a relatively common question, and it is precisely the subject of the field of pragmatics. In order to know what someone means by what s/he says, it is not enough to know the meanings of the words (semantics) and how they have been strung together into a sentence (syntax); we also need to know who utters the sentence and in what context, and to be able to make inferences regarding why they say it and what they intend us to understand (Birner 2013:1). As another example, “*There's one piece of pizza left*” can be understood as an offer (“*Would you*

like some?”) or a warning (“*It is mine!*”) or a scolding (“*You haven’t finished your dinner*”), depending on the situation, even if the follow-up comments in parentheses are never uttered. People commonly mean quite a lot more than they say explicitly, and it is up to their addressees to figure out what additional meaning they might have intended to convey.

Mwihaki (2004:128) asserts that meaning as use refers to speaker meaning and particularly the intention of the speaker or the desired communicative effect of the utterance. This approach to the notion of meaning is validated on the basis of the conviction that language is purposive; when one speaks, s/he intends to achieve particular ends. Language use therefore implies making the appropriate choices of linguistic forms for the appropriate communicative setting and cultural context. Additionally, Sperber and Wilson (2002:3) argue that pragmatic studies of verbal communication start from the assumption that an essential feature of most human communication, both verbal and non-verbal, is the expression and recognition of intentions (Grice, 1982, 1989). Based on this approach, pragmatic interpretation is ultimately an exercise in metapsychology, in which the hearer infers the speaker’s intended meaning from evidence s/he has provided for this purpose. An utterance, of course, is a linguistically coded piece of evidence so that verbal comprehension should involve an element of decoding. However, the decoded linguistic meaning is merely the starting point for an inferential process that results in the attribution of a speaker’s meaning.

Pragmatics, according to Kasper and Rose (2001:2), is also thought to be the study of communicative action in its socio-cultural context. Communicative action includes not only using speech acts (such as apologizing, complaining, complimenting, and requesting), but also engaging in different types of discourse and participating in speech events of varying length and complexity.

Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to deal with the general notion of pragmatics which is largely the study of language in use (Traugott 2012:549; Birner 2013:2; Griffiths 2006:14; Kasper and Rose 2001:2; Levinson 1983:12). The second chapter will focus on semantics and pragmatics and on the concepts of semantic meaning, pragmatic meaning, sentence, utterance, presupposition and entailment and the relationships between these terms. After supplying a general framework for the above mentioned concepts, the third chapter will shed light to the cooperative principle and the conversational maxims that the British philosopher H. P. Grice introduced in 1975. Then in the fourth chapter, the topics such as what is implied and what is inferred and how the same utterances may change according to the varying situations, conventional implicatures, conversational implicatures, the types of conversational implicatures and the properties of conversational implicatures will be dealt with and finally a concluding chapter will present some final remarks and focus on the topics covered. However, it is almost impossible to analyze the topics and approaches that pragmatics includes. So the main goal is to give a brief insight to such areas especially in the communication and interaction processes.

CHAPTER 2

SEMANTICS AND PRAGMATICS

After a brief introduction about the field of pragmatics and its study areas, the present chapter will mainly focus on the differences between two closely related fields of linguistics; namely semantics and pragmatics. When semantics is considered, the first thing that comes to mind is the study of meaning and this meaning is the literal meaning which does not change from one person to another. However, the same sentence could mean something else based on the intention of the sender. This is where pragmatics fits into and the addressee has to deduce the meaning of the sentence or utterance by taking into consideration the context. That is why semantics may be considered as static whereas pragmatics is dynamic.

Semantics and pragmatics are the two main areas of linguistics that study the knowledge we use both to extract meaning when we hear or read, and to convey meaning when we speak or write. Within linguistics itself, the dividing line between these two disciplines is still under considerable debate (Peccei, 1999:1). However, generally speaking, semantics concentrates on the meaning that comes from purely linguistic knowledge, while pragmatics concentrates on those aspects of the meaning that cannot be predicted by linguistic knowledge alone and takes into account knowledge about the physical and social world.

While semantics deals with a broad range of phenomena including the nature of meaning and the role of syntactic structure

in the interpretation of sentences, pragmatics, on the other hand, investigates how the meaning that the speaker intends to communicate by using a particular utterance in a particular context is understood by the addressee (O'Grady, 1996:305). According to Yule (1996:4), semantics is the study of the relationships between linguistic forms and entities in the real world; that is, how words are literally connected to things and pragmatics is the study of the relationships between linguistic forms and the users of those forms.

Ibrahim and Abbas (2010:20) claim that the focus of pragmatic analysis is on the meaning of speakers' utterances rather than on the meaning of words or sentences. It is the study of the ability of natural language speakers to communicate more than what is explicitly stated. Another perspective is that pragmatics deals with the ways we reach our goal in communication. Suppose, a person wants to ask someone else to stop smoking. This can be achieved by using several utterances. The person could simply say, "*Stop smoking, please!*" which is direct and with clear semantic meaning; alternatively, the person could say, "*This room needs an air purifier*" which implies a similar meaning but is indirect and therefore requires pragmatic inference to derive the intended meaning. Thus, pragmatics is regarded as one of the most challenging aspects for language learners to grasp, and can only truly be learned through experience. Language meaning can be analyzed at several levels and has a direct connection with semantics and pragmatics. Therefore, semantics covers what expressions mean, while pragmatics deals with what speakers mean in using the expressions. Thus different interpretations may arise from the same sentence and Bates (2004:34) exemplifies it perfectly:

(1) A: She got it last week.

It is possible to analyse this sentence semantically and decide that the subject is a woman who possesses something and it happened one week ago. But we cannot be sure of the speaker's intended meaning from this level of analysis alone. The following

utterance is very likely to change our assumption about the meaning and the message. Speaker B responds by saying:

(1a): But she didn't deserve it! Managers can be so unfair!

or another response would lead the hearer or reader to a different assumption:

(1b): She should have gone to the hospital earlier.

or another:

(1c): That courier is very reliable.

Each of these various responses from B suggests that the statement A may well give away to three different conversations whereas A by itself does not convey enough meaning for the addressee to understand the utterance.

When a speaker uses a piece of language, in order for the hearer to understand or interpret it, s/he should keep in mind the context to deduce a successful inference. So, semantics involves the meaning of the words and the sentences without taking into consideration the contextual factors. That is why it may also be called as the sentence meaning whereas the pragmatic meaning may be referred to as the speaker meaning or the intended meaning.

It is also possible to point to interesting discrepancies between the speaker meaning and the sentence meaning. Levinson (1983:17) gives an example to make it clear; "*Linguistics is fascinating*" may ironically be intended by the speaker to communicate "Linguistics is deadly boring". Further, there appear to be general conventions about the use of language that require (or, perhaps, merely recommend) a certain degree of implicitness in communication, with the consequence that it is virtually ensured that what the speaker means by any utterance is not exhausted by the meaning of the linguistic form uttered. How, then, is the full communicative intention to be recognized? The answer seems to be obvious. It is to be recognized by taking into account, not only the meaning of the utterance, but

also the precise mechanisms (like irony, or general assumptions of a certain level of implicitness) which may cause a divergence between the meaning of the utterance and what is communicated by the utterance in a particular context.

Semantics is the study of the relation between linguistic expressions and their meanings as Szabo (2005:4) argues and pragmatics is the study of context, or more precisely, a study of the way how the context can influence our understanding of linguistic utterances.

If semantics studies the linguistic expressions themselves and abstracts from the speaker and the utterance context, then the meaning studied by semantics cannot be determined by the intentions of the speaker and/or the contextual circumstances. That is as Gutzmann (2014:4) stresses, the only meaning aspect that falls under the scope of semantics is the literal meaning of an expression, by which the meaning that an expression has by linguistic, semantic conventions, irrespective of any actual use of the expression. On the other hand, pragmatics deals with concrete utterance tokens made by speakers in concrete discourse situations which are located in time and space, while semantics abstracts away from those concrete contextual factors.

According to Ting and Snedeker (2009:1725), semantics is the aspects of the interpretation that can be directly calculated from the meanings of words and the structural relationships between them. In contrast, pragmatics refers to the aspects of interpretation that are inferred through an analysis of the context and the communicator's goals. Therefore, to put it simply, when the meaning is concerned, there is no context to consider, then it is related to semantics. And, if there is a context to take into account, then it means it is the content of pragmatics.

In a text, listeners and readers have the task of guessing what the sender of an utterance intends to communicate. As soon as a satisfactory guess has been made, the sender has succeeded in

conveying the meaning. So, pragmatics is about how we interpret utterances and produce interpretable utterances, either way taking account of context and background knowledge (Griffiths, 2006:21). Referring and understanding other people's acts of reference usually require us to use and pragmatically interpret the words, ones that have meanings tied to the situation of utterance.

Talking about people's intended meanings, their assumptions, their purposes or goals, and the kinds of actions that they are performing when they are speaking could be the advantages of studying language via pragmatics. As Birner (2013:28) states, drawing the boundary between semantic meaning and pragmatic meaning is not as straightforward as it might appear. For example, semantic meaning is often defined as truth-conditional meaning, while pragmatic meaning is often referred to as meaning that does not affect the truth conditions of the utterance. Thus, it can be stated that semantic meaning is both context-independent and truth-conditional while pragmatic meaning is context-dependent and non-truth-conditional.

For truth conditionality, a procedure could be applied to test whether two expressions semantically differ in meaning or not. If an expression is substituted by another one while leaving the rest of the sentence as it was and the truth conditions of the sentence change, the two expressions differ in semantic meaning. If the truth conditions remain the same, their semantic meaning must also be the same. Applying this procedure, according to Gutzmann (2014:5), shows, for instance, that cat and dog differ in meaning because substituting one for the other changes the truth condition of the overall sentence. (2a) may well be true while (2b) is false and vice versa.

(2a) A dog sleeps under the chair.

(2b) A cat sleeps under the chair.

The question of context-dependence has to do with whether the meaning of a linguistic form changes with the context in which

it is uttered. One commonly used test to see whether some piece of meaning is semantic or pragmatic is to see whether it remains constant regardless of context (Birner, 2013:29). For example, consider (3):

(3) This weather is too cold.

There are a number of elements in (3) whose meaning is constant, regardless of the context of the utterance. The word *weather*, for example, means something along the lines of atmospheric conditions, including temperature, wind, and precipitation regardless of when or where the word is used. Likewise, although the word *cold* is vague (in the sense that what is cold to one person might not be cold to another), it consistently is used to refer to the low end of some scale of temperature. These meanings, then, are context-independent and semantic. On the other hand, the meaning of *this* depends entirely on the context in which the sentence is uttered. It could be pointing anything.

And similarly, what is meant by *too cold* – that is, how cold is too cold – depends on the speaker and the context. For example, it might be interpreted as *too cold for my tastes*, if for instance it is uttered by someone first stepping outside. But in a different context, it might be interpreted with respect to some potential activity, if for instance it is uttered by someone who plans going on a picnic outdoors on an autumn day. In either case, what counts as too cold will be relative to the speaker; what is too cold for one might not be ideal for another.

For a string of linguistic expressions to be successfully interpreted, context has long been considered a crucial factor. If a hearer has some difficulties in interpreting the expression, s/he should first consider the factors related to the context and then look for the hints to get the right meaning. These contextual factors could be classified into two groups as situational and non-situational context. Whereas situational context involves time, place, and the social relationship between the interlocutors the other type, non-

situational context, may well be referred to as linguistic context. In the latter one, the hearer looks at the relationships between the words in the sentence and this may also support the hearer to deduce a correct interpretation. However, situational context is of utmost importance for the hearer to grasp the speaker's intended meaning.

In order to get the intended meaning, shared knowledge between the interlocutors is also significant. The speaker and the hearer should share some common linguistic expressions, world knowledge and presumed information about each other. So, context which falls under the area of pragmatics is vital for the right meaning to be inferred.

In real uses, as Requejo (2007:170) argues, context always comes first, that is, before the linguistic unit can be interpreted there is a big amount of information available to participants that will direct the process of meaning construction and determine which sense, from all the possible ones, must be selected. As context is related to several aspects of the physical or social setting of an utterance, the hearer should rely on it deeply in order to get the interpretation of the speaker's utterance. Since the pragmatic meaning surpasses semantic meaning, Speaks (2008:107) concludes that it is now a commonplace that what a speaker means, asserts, or conveys by an utterance of a sentence can go beyond what the sentence means (semantically expresses) in the context of an utterance.

When we encode an utterance, our hearer or reader can use dictionary and/or grammar knowledge to decode it to the point of establishing its meaning in a kind of general purpose sense (Swan, 2007:3). But, as we are constantly reminded, the dictionary/grammar meaning of any utterance underdetermines its meaning in context; its value, or the role it plays in the ongoing communication. To understand a sentence like "*Your driver will be here in half an hour*", a hearer needs to feed a good deal of extra information into the utterance; the fact that in this instance the variable *your* refers

to the hearer himself/herself; the exact identity of the driver in question; the location of *here*; and the time frame within which *in half an hour* has to be calculated. None of this information is encoded in the grammar and semantics of the sentence itself. Correct interpretations of utterances can indeed take hearers a very long way away from their surface encodings. In specific situations like the following sentences, for example, might be used to convey the messages shown in parentheses (or other very different ones), and be successfully understood as doing so.

- i. Your jacket's on the floor. (Pick up your jacket.)
- ii. Mick's got his exams on Tuesday. (I can't come to dinner.)
- iii. It's Friday. (Do the laundry.)

Based on the discussions that have been made about the meaning and the distinction between the two major subfields of linguistics, first of all both disciplines are concerned with meaning. However, semantic deals with the sentence meaning whereas pragmatics goes beyond it and considers contextual factors and the shared knowledge between the interlocutors. Hence, in order for the hearer to get the real message behind the words used by the speaker, it is necessary to interpret it thoroughly and this cannot be succeeded just at the sentence level. The intended meaning could be identified with the help of context which falls under the domain of pragmatics.

2.1 Sentence and Utterance

Semantics and pragmatics are the two main branches of the linguistic study of meaning as mentioned in the preceding parts of the study. So, when semantics is considered, it would be better to talk about sentences while examining pragmatics, it is the utterance in the focus. This is the reason why to differentiate between these two terms is crucial. According to Griffiths (2006:6), the essential difference between sentences and utterances is that sentences are abstract, not tied to contexts whereas utterances are identified by

their contexts. This is also the main way of distinguishing between semantics and pragmatics as stated before.

Meaning is what semantics is supposed to deal with and a theory of interpretation is traditionally assumed to be drawn upon its results. Interpretation, according to this view, is the act of determining what the meaning of an utterance is. So meaning and interpretation are thought of as standing in a quite definite relationship; meaning somehow must be specified as independent of and prior to interpretation (Stokhof, 2002:222). These are all cases of situations in which interpretation comes into play when there is a meaning, but this meaning somehow does not fit. But a similar idea underlies the conception of interpretation as it operates in situations when no initial meaning can be assigned; for example when an expression is used that we do not know the meaning of. Here, too, it is assumed that such a meaning exists, and that what interpretation does is to recover it (from the context, or by other means). The picture that emerges sets meaning and interpretation clearly against each other. Meaning is an entity, some kind of abstract or mental object, which is somehow contained in an utterance, which is produced in a mechanistic fashion, and which requires no conscious processing for its production. Interpretation, on the other hand, is a process which operates on utterances and in which one intends to recover a meaning in a more or less conscious fashion.

Hurford and Heasley (1983:15), define an utterance as any stretch of talk, by one person, before and after which there is silence on the part of that person. Thus, an utterance is the use by a particular speaker, on a particular occasion, of a piece of language, such as a sequence of sentences, or a single phrase, or even a single word. For example, "Hello", "It's fine" are thought as utterances whereas "Gfdrthiytk", "Chlrseentfy" are not utterances. Another feature of utterances is that they are physical events. Events are temporal, so utterances die on the wind, they cannot resist.

However, a sentence is neither a physical event nor a physical object. It is conceived abstractly, a string of words put together by the grammatical rules of a language. A sentence can be thought of as the ideal string of words behind various realizations in utterances or inscriptions. Strictly, a book such as this contains no utterances since books do not talk. For instance, “*Sorry!*” represents an utterance. To put it simply, a sentence is a string of words consisting of the same words in the same order. For an utterance, it would make sense to talk about accents, because the way of pronouncing the words belong to the utterance, not to the sentence uttered by the speaker.

If someone says “*It’s cold in here!*”, it would be an utterance and if another person in the same place says “*It’s cold in here!*”, this would also be another utterance.

Furthermore, Rambaud (2012:23) argues that sentences are abstract grammatical elements obtained from utterances. They are abstracted or generalized from actual language use.

Sentences have literal meanings. The literal meaning of a sentence is entirely determined by the meanings of its component words and the syntactical rules according to which these elements are combined (Searle 1978:207). The literal meaning of a sentence needs to be sharply distinguished from what a speaker means by the sentence when s/he utters it to perform a speech act, for the speaker’s utterance meaning may depart from the literal sentence meaning in a variety of ways. For example, in uttering a sentence, a speaker may mean something different from what the sentence means, as in the case of a metaphor; or s/he may even mean the opposite of what the sentence means, as in the case of an irony; or s/he may mean what the sentence means but may mean something more as well. In the limiting case what the sentence means and what the speaker means may be exactly the same; for example, the speaker might in a certain context utter the sentence “*The cat is on the mat*” and mean exactly and literally that the cat is on the mat.

So, after observing the distinction between sentences and utterances, another crucial differentiation has to be made between a presupposition and an entailment.

2.2 Presupposition and entailment

It is worth noting at the outset that presupposition and entailment were considered to be much more central to pragmatics in the past than they are now. Without some introduction to that type of analytic discussion, however, it becomes very difficult to understand how the current relationship between semantics and pragmatics have been developed (Yule 1996:25). A presupposition is something the speaker assumes to be the case prior to making an utterance. Speakers, not sentences, have presuppositions. An entailment is something that logically follows from what is asserted in the utterance. Sentences, not speakers, have entailments. For example;

(4) Jenny's brother bought two cars.

In producing the utterance above, the speaker will normally be expected to have the presuppositions that a person called Jenny exists and that she has a brother. The speaker may also hold the more specific presuppositions that Jenny has only one brother and that he has a lot of money. All of these presuppositions belong to the speaker and all can be wrong, in fact. The sentence given in the above example will be treated as having the entailments that Jenny's brother bought something, bought two cars, bought one car, and many other similar logical consequences. These entailments follow from the sentence, regardless of whether the speaker's beliefs are right or wrong, in fact. They are communicated without being said. Because of its logical nature, however, an entailment is not generally discussed as much in pragmatics as the more speaker-dependent notion of a presupposition.

Similarly, Peccei (1999:9) describes an entailment as a relationship between sentences that forms the basis for some of the inferences. Interpreting utterances involves a considerable amount of intelligent guess work where the hearer draws inferences from the speaker's words to arrive at the speaker's meaning. We normally do not expect people to tell us something we already know. Presuppositions are closely linked to the words and grammatical structures that are actually used in the utterance and our knowledge about the way language users conventionally interpret them. Presuppositions can be drawn even when there is little or no surrounding context.

Speakers mostly have some evidence about what they presuppose. For instance, if a speaker utters "*Katy's car broke down again*", the speaker simply believes that Katy has a car and it had broken down before. Also the hearer cannot deny the same facts and presupposes the same.

Presupposition is treated as a relationship between two propositions as Yule (1996:25) highlights. If we say that the sentence in (5a) contains the proposition p and the sentence in (5b) contains the proposition q , then, using the symbol \gg to mean "presupposes", we can represent the relationship as in (5c).

(5a) Jenny's cat is cute. (= p)

(5b) Jenny has a cat. (= q)

(5c) $p \gg q$

Interestingly, when we produce the opposite of the sentences in (5a) by negating it (=NOT p), as in (6a), we find that the relationship of presupposition does not change. That is, the same proposition q , repeated as (6b), continues to be presupposed by NOT p , as shown in (6c).

(6a) Jenny's cat isn't cute. (=NOT p)

(6b) Jenny has a cat. (= q)

(6c) NOT $p \gg q$

This property of presupposition is generally described as constancy under negation. Basically, it means that the presupposition of a statement will remain constant (i.e. still true) even when that statement is negated. As a further example, consider a situation in which you disagree (via a negative, as in (7b)) with someone who has already made the statement in (7a).

(7a) Everybody knows that John is rich. (= q)

(7b) Everybody doesn't know that John is rich. (=NOT p)

(7c) John is rich. (= q)

(7d) $p \gg q$ & NOT $p \gg q$

Notice that, although both speakers disagree about the validity of p (i.e. the statement in 7a), they both assume the truth of q (i.e. 7c) in making their statements. The proposition q , as shown in (7d), is presupposed by both p and NOT p , remaining constant under negation.

Presuppositions are the shared background assumptions that are taken for granted when the communication occurs. These are important in pragmatics as Griffiths (2006:143) asserts because they are essential to the construction of the connected discourse. Shared background presuppositions are also the obvious starting point for a reader or listener wondering what the author of a message might regard as relevant. People who know each other well can build up quite accurate impressions of what assumptions are shared between them, but it is harder to be aware of which aspects of that information the other person is thinking about at any point in a communicative interaction; and for communications between strangers it is even harder to know what is presupposed. If, having missed out on the first distribution of dessert, you are asked "*Would you like some more dessert?*" you cannot really answer with a simple "*Yes, please*" or "*No, thank you*". The problem is that "more" indicates that the questioner presupposes you have already had some. Both answers would pick up and preserve a part of the question: "*Yes, please (I would like some*

more)” and “No, thank you (*I would not like any more*)”. That means that “more” is still there pointing to the same false presupposition that you have already had some dessert.

For constancy under negation, consider the following example:

(8a) The treatment has worked with his sister.

(8b) The treatment hasn't worked with his sister. “His sister was ill”

(8c) Has the treatment worked with his sister? }

Presuppositions are not affected by negation of the asserted part of a sentence, and questioning the main drift of a sentence leaves the presuppositions intact, too. Survival in this way is symptomatic of presuppositions being information that is assumed to be true. By way of contrast, (9b) shows that entailments do not, in general, survive negation.

(9a) The treatment has worked with his sister. \Rightarrow ‘His sister is well’

(9b) The treatment hasn't worked with his sister. \Rightarrow ‘His sister is well’

Therefore, to put it simply, as Lafi (2008:5) underlines, negation alters entailments but it leaves the presuppositions untouched. For example:

(10a) She managed to stop in time .

From the above utterance, it can be inferred as:

(10b) She stopped in time.

(10c) She tried to stop in time.

And if we take the negation of (10a):

(10d) She didn't manage to stop in time.

From (10d) we cannot infer (10b). In fact, the main point of the utterance (10d) could be to deny (10b). Yet the inference to (10c) is preserved and thus shared by both (10a) and its negation (10d). On the basis of the negation test, then, (10b) is entailment of (10a), whereas (10c) is a presupposition of both (10a) and (10d).

Constancy under negation thus is a useful way for identifying presuppositions. The inferences that survive this initial test may be said to be the potential candidates for presuppositions.

Nonetheless, if the presupposition does not hold, the utterance is inappropriate; to utter “*The King of France is wise*” in a world that contains no King of France is communicatively pointless and therefore bizarre (Birner, 2013:163). If a presupposition is defined in terms of the common ground shared by the speaker and hearer, many of the problems with purely semantic approaches will disappear. In most of the problematic cases encountered, the primary problem has been that mutual knowledge, context, and the information presented in the utterance itself can override the presupposition. Moreover, there are also differences in the strengths of various presuppositions, which again suggests that pragmatic principles are involved:

(11a) The King of France is wise.

(11b) John thinks he is the King of France.

(11c) Jane had lunch with the King of France.

(11d) Joey is dressing up as the King of France for Halloween.

As seen, (11a) strongly presupposes the king’s existence, whereas (11b) is entirely neutral on the matter. Example (11c) seems to fall somewhere between the two, and unlike (11a), it seems straightforwardly false in a world lacking a King of France. Note that its negation does not seem to assume that there is a King of France, which argues for the king’s existence being an entailment rather than a presupposition in this case:

(12) Jane did not have lunch with the King of France.

O’Grady (1996:296) argues that there are many other ways in which a speaker’s beliefs can be reflected in language use. Compare the following two sentences.

(13a) Have you stopped exercising regularly?

(13b) Have you tried exercising regularly?

Use of the verb *stop* implies a belief on the part of the speaker that the listener has been exercising regularly. No such assumption is associated with the verb *try*. Hence, in presuppositions, the assumption or belief is implied by the use of a particular word or structure. The following two sentences provide another example of this.

(14a) Nick admitted that the team had lost.

(14b) Nick said that the team had lost.

Choice of the verb *admit* indicates that the speaker who utters (14a) is presupposing the truth of the claim that the team lost. No such presupposition is associated with choice of the verb *say* in (14b). The speaker is simply reporting Nick's statement without taking a position on its accuracy.

In entailments, a relation in which the truth of one sentence necessarily implies the truth of another (O'Grady, 1996:272). In the cases considered, the entailment relation between the *a*) and *b*) sentences is mutual since the truth of either sentence guarantees the truth of the other. In some cases, however, entailment is asymmetrical. The following examples illustrate this:

(15a) The park wardens killed the lion.

(15b) The lion is dead.

(16a) Danny is a man.

(16b) Danny is human.

The *a*) sentences in (15) and (16) entail the *b*) sentences. If it is true that the park wardens killed the lion, then it must also be true that the lion is dead. However, the reverse does not follow since the lion could be dead without the park wardens having killed it. Similarly, if it is true that Danny is a man, then it is also true that Danny is human. Once again, though, the reverse does not hold; even if we know that Danny is a human, we cannot conclude that Danny is a man rather than a woman or a child.

A presupposition is a background belief, relating to an utterance, which must be mutually known or assumed by the speaker and hearer for the utterance to be considered appropriate in context will generally remain a necessary assumption whether the utterance is placed in the form of an assertion, denial, or question, and can be associated with a specific lexical item or grammatical feature in the utterance (Ibrahim and Abbas, 2010:11). In pragmatics, a presupposition is an assumption about the world whose truth is taken for granted in discourse. Presuppositions are inferences that are very closely linked to the words and grammatical structures actually used in the utterance. However, they come from our knowledge about the way language users conventionally interpret these words and structures.

Allwood (1975:1) claims that presuppositions are very important in our understanding of how background and context determine the interpretation of a sentence. Additionally, Sbisá (1999:331) stresses that an utterance can be said to presuppose a proposition when it contains a linguistic element which functions as a presupposition trigger, and is therefore appropriate only if the associated presupposition is among the interlocutors' shared assumptions.

Entailment which is a crucial semantic relation can be defined in terms of valid rules of inference, or alternatively in terms of the assignment of truth and falsity (Lafi 2008:1). If entailments are crucial to semantic relation, presuppositions, it may be said, are typical pragmatic relations.

To make the distinction between a presupposition and an entailment more clear, Xu (2009:2) gives the following examples;

(17a) Paul is angry because Jim crashed the car.

(17b) Jim crashed the car.

By considering presuppositions, we can get that if “Paul is angry because Jim crashed the car” is true, then “Jim crashed the car” is true.

If Paul isn't angry because Jim crashed the car, then "Jim crashed the car" is still true.

If Jim "crashed the car" is true, Paul may be angry or not.

If Jim "crashed the car" is false, that means maybe nothing happened about the car, so (17a) is meaningless.

(18a) Argentina is bigger than Liechtenstein.

(18b) Liechtenstein is smaller than Argentina.

By considering entailments, we can get that if "Argentina is bigger than Liechtenstein" is true, then "Liechtenstein is smaller than Argentina" is true.

If "Liechtenstein is smaller than Argentina" is false, then "Argentina is bigger than Liechtenstein" is false.

If "Argentina is bigger than Liechtenstein" is false, then "Liechtenstein is smaller than Argentina" may be true or false; if "Liechtenstein is smaller than Argentina" is true, then "Argentina is bigger than Liechtenstein" is true or false.

According to Lafi (2008:15), entailments and presuppositions play vital roles in the organization and management of conversational interactions. Entailments account for the literal meaning of the sentences uttered whereas presuppositions account for the background assumptions and shared knowledge (world view) against which the utterances in conversations make sense.

Therefore, when examining the relations in the sentences and utterances, it is definitely worth while figuring out how to distinguish an entailment and a presupposition from each other since it would be very practical in understanding the meanings of the sentences both semantically and pragmatically. In this way, a strong interpretation of an utterance could be realized by the addressee.

COOPERATIVE PRINCIPLE AND CONVERSATIONAL MAXIMS

This chapter considers the notion of cooperative principle and outlines briefly the conversational maxims proposed by Grice (1975). When two interlocutors engage in a conversation, each has distinct burdens. On one hand, the speaker has to adjust his/her talking style to that of the listener. In other words, s/he should consider the background knowledge of the listener and choose his/her words and sentences accordingly. On the other hand, the listener's burden is as difficult as that of the speaker. S/he should take into consideration the contextual factors and try to infer what is uttered to him/her since many utterances might convey implicit meanings. Due to the fact that turn takings occur in the natural flow of a conversation, this process has to be carried out cooperatively. Hence, a conversation which takes place between the interlocutors is a joint procedure and is referred to as cooperative principle by Grice (1975:45). H.P. Grice had worked with J. L. Austin at Oxford in the 1940's and 1950's and his work on the cooperative principle and its related conversational maxims arises from the same tradition of ordinary language philosophy. Like Austin before him, Grice was invited to give the William James lectures at Harvard University, and it was there in 1967 that he first outlined his theory of implicature (a shorter version of which was published in 1975 in a paper "Logic and conversation") (Thomas 1995:56). Grice's theory is an attempt to explain how a hearer gets from what is said to what is meant, from the level of expressed meaning to the level of implied meaning.

As Sperber and Wilson (2002:4) presents the following examples, the hearer may arrive at different interpretations;

- (19a) The movie was as you would expect.
- (19b) Some of the students did well in the exam.
- (19c) Someone's forgotten to clean the table.
- (19d) Teacher: Have you handed in your essay?
Student: I've had a lot to do recently.
- (19e) John is a teacher.

For example, (19a) may implicate that the lecture was good (or bad), (19b) may implicate that not all the students did well in the exam, (19c) may convey an indirect request and (19d) an indirect answer, while (19e) may be literally, metaphorically or ironically intended. Pragmatic interpretation involves the resolution of such linguistic indeterminacies on the basis of contextual information. And as stated before, the hearer's task is to find the meaning the speaker intends to convey.

There has also been a growing interest in the meaning of utterances rather than just sentences. It has been repeatedly noted that at the discourse level there is no one-to-one mapping between linguistic form and utterance meaning (Davies 2000:1). A particular intended meaning can in fact be conveyed by any number of utterances. Grice is concerned with this distinction between saying and meaning. How do speakers know how to generate these implicit meanings, and how can they assume that their addressees will reliably understand their intended meaning? His aim is to discover the mechanism behind this process.

- (20) A: Is there any bread left?
B: I'm going to the supermarket in five minutes.

In the above example, a competent speaker of English would have little trouble inferring the meaning that there is no more bread

at the moment, but that some will be bought from the supermarket shortly.

Our talk exchanges do not normally consist of a succession of disconnected remarks, and would not be rational if they did. They are characteristically, to some degree at least, cooperative efforts; and each participant recognizes in them, to some extent, a common purpose or set of purposes, or at least a mutually accepted direction. This purpose or direction may be fixed from the start (e.g., by an initial proposal of a question for discussion, or it may evolve during the exchange; it may be fairly definite, or it may be so indefinite as to leave very considerable latitude to the participants (as in a casual conversation). But at each stage, some possible conversational moves would be excluded as conversationally unsuitable. So, Grice (1989:26) formulates a rough general principle which participants will be expected to observe by verbalizing as: "Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged".

The cooperative principle is a fundamental principle governing conversational exchanges. Essentially, this principle holds that people in a conversation normally cooperate with one another, and, crucially, that they assume that the others are cooperating. That is, when you say something, and another person makes a response, you assume that the response is intended as a maximally cooperative one, and you interpret it accordingly (Trask 1999:57).

The main import of an utterance may, in fact, easily lie not with the thought expressed by the utterance (that is, with what is communicated directly) but rather with the thought(s) that the hearer assumes the speaker intends to suggest or hint at (Spencer-Oatey and Zegarac, 2002:78). More technically, it lies what is implicated, or communicated indirectly. So, pragmatics needs to explain how implicitly communicated ideas are recovered.

Consider the following scenario. There is a woman sitting on a park bench and a large dog lying on the ground in front of the bench. A man comes along and sits down on the bench.

(21) Man: Does your dog bite?

Woman: No.

(The man reaches down to pet the dog. The dog bites the man's hand.)

Man: Ouch! Hey! You said your dog doesn't bite.

Woman: He doesn't. But that's not my dog.

According to Yule (1996:36), one of the problems in this scenario has to do with communication. Specifically, it seems to be a problem caused by the man's assumption that more was communicated than was said. It is not a problem with presupposition because the assumption in *your dog* (i.e. the woman has a dog) is true for both speakers. The problem is the man's assumption that his question "*Does your dog bite?*" and the woman's answer "*No*" both apply to the dog in front of them. From the man's perspective, the woman's answer provides less information than expected. In other words, she might be expected to provide the information stated in the last line. Of course, if she had mentioned this information earlier, the story would not be as funny. For the event to be funny, the woman has to give less information than is expected.

An expected amount of information provided in a conversation is just one aspect of the more general idea that people involved in a conversation will cooperate with each other. (Of course, the woman in (21) may actually be indicating that she does not want to take part in any cooperative interaction with the stranger). In most circumstances, the assumption of cooperation is so pervasive that it can be stated as a cooperative principle of conversation.

The cooperative principle is the overriding social rule which speakers generally try to follow in conversation. The cooperative

principle can be stated simply as “be as helpful to your hearer as you can” (Hurford and Heasley, 1983:26). The fact that speakers are assumed to follow this principle is used by hearers in making inferences from the utterances they hear.

Interlocutors consistently do make their utterances appropriate in context. To do otherwise would be, in a word, uncooperative. Grice’s fundamental insight is that conversation can work only because both people are trying to be cooperative – trying to make their contribution appropriate to the conversation at hand. Even when one might assume the participants are in fact being utterly uncooperative – say, in the course of a bitter argument, in which neither wants the other to gain any ground – they are in fact being conversationally cooperative: They stick to the topic (or at least relevant side topics), they say interpretable things in a reasonably concise way, and they try to complete their thoughts while not giving distracting or irrelevant details. A truly uncooperative interlocutor would be almost impossible to have a successful argument with; such an individual would comment irrelevantly on the weather, or fail to respond at all, perhaps choosing to read the newspaper instead (Birner 2013:42). In short, whether the conversation is a friendly or a hostile one, it is only because the participants are trying to be cooperative that the conversation can proceed. Moreover, it is only because each assumes that the other is being cooperative that they stand a chance of being able to accurately interpret each other’s comments.

Grice sees a discourse as a collaborative effort. A discourse is a joint project in which the interlocutors mean to achieve one or more common goals. Obviously, there are indefinite number of goals a discourse may serve. People talk to each other to exchange information, to negotiate a deal, to settle disputes, and so on. But in any given case the number of discourse goals will be fairly small, and apparent to all interlocutors; they are, after all, common goals.

Given that a discourse is a joint project between interlocutors, it is natural enough to suppose that an utterance will normally be interpreted in the light of the current discourse goals, on the assumption that was designed by the speaker to further these goals. In other words, Geurts (2009:11) asserts that the hearer will assume that the speaker intends to abide by the cooperative principle.

However, the fact that Grice expressed the cooperative principle in the imperative mood has led some casual readers of his work to believe that Grice was telling speakers how they ought to behave. Thomas (1995:62) argues that what he was actually doing was suggesting that in conversational interaction people work on the assumption that a certain set of rules is in operation unless they receive indications to the contrary. The same is true of conversation. Within a given community, when we talk we operate according to a set of assumptions and, on the whole, we get by. There will be times when we may suspend our assumption that our interlocutor is operating according to the same conversational norms as we are. And there will be times when our assumptions are wrong and then mistakes and misunderstandings occur, or when we are deliberately misled by our interlocutor. In setting out his cooperative principle, Grice was not suggesting that people are always good and kind or cooperative in any everyday sense of that word. He was simply noting that, on the whole, people observe certain regularities in interaction and his aim was to explain one particular set of regularities - those governing the generation and interpretation of conversational implicature. Consider the following example:

(22) The speaker has accidentally locked herself out in the middle of a freezing night with no warm clothes on:

A: Do you want a coat?

B: No, I really want to stand out here in the freezing cold with no clothes on.

On the face of it, B's reply is untrue and uncooperative, but in fact this is the sort of sarcastic reply we encounter everyday and have no problem at all in interpreting. How do we interpret it? According to Grice, if A assumes that, in spite of appearances, B is observing the cooperative principle and has made an appropriate response to his question, he will look for an alternative interpretation.

Grice proposed that all speakers, regardless of their cultural background, adhere to a basic principle governing conversation; the cooperative principle. That is, we assume that in a conversation the participants will cooperate with each other when making their contributions. The cooperative principle works in both directions, in the sense that speakers observe it and listeners assume that speakers are observing it (Peccei, 1999:27; Slocum 2016:27).

Cooperative principle is the main branch of Grice's conversational implicature theory as Wang (2011:1163) states. To achieve a successful conversation, participants must be cooperative with each other. Therefore, both the speaker and the addressee have to follow certain syntactic, semantic and pragmatic rules in order to communicate effectively. In other words, the participants should cooperate, and then their utterances can be relevant to each other. Only in this way can the participants infer what the other one really means in their conversation.

Communication is not a matter of logic or absolute truth, but of cooperation. In reality, people, who go into a conversation with each other, follow the cooperative principle, i.e. both the speaker and the listener are assumed to want a conversation to work (Bunina and Timoshenko, 2014:29). The cooperative principle is a guarantee for successful communication. There are times when people say exactly what they mean, but generally they are not totally explicit. They manage to transmit far more than their words mean or even something quite different from the meaning of their words.

Grice (1975, 1978) proposed an approach to the speaker's and hearer's cooperative use of inference and postulated a kind of tacit agreement between speakers and listeners to cooperate in communication. He organized his discussion into a number of maxims or principles (Rambaud, 2012:101). The maxims are not rules but they seem to explain how inference works in conversation, and seems to be followed by speakers engaged in conversation.

The cooperative principle put forward by Grice (1975:45) consists of four maxims, each of which covers one aspect of linguistic interaction and describes what is expected of a cooperative speaker with respect to that maxim. The four main maxims are as follows:

a. Maxim of quality

Try to make your contribution one that is true.

(i) Do not say what you believe to be false.

(ii) Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

b. Maxim of quantity

(i) Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange).

(ii) Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.

c. Maxim of relation

Be relevant.

d. Maxim of manner

Be perspicuous.

(i) Avoid obscurity of expression.

(ii) Avoid ambiguity.

(iii) Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).

(iv) Be orderly.

Based on the conversational maxims, Lauer (2013:235) states that the idea was, roughly, that interlocutors take each other to follow these maxims as best as they can - i.e., that they obey the maxims in choosing which utterances to make. Implicatures then arise as assumptions that are necessary to justify the speaker's utterance in the light of the maxims, or, where the maxims are in conflict or ostentatiously violated, in the light of the more general cooperative principle.

A good question answering system often needs to provide a response that specifies more information than strictly required by the question. It should not, however, provide too much information or provide information that is of no use to the person who made the query (Allen and Perrault, 1980:143). For example, consider the following exchange at an information booth in a train station:

(23) A: When does the Madrid train leave?

B: 6:45 at gate 4.

Although the departure location was not explicitly requested, B provided it in his answer.

The maxims mentioned above can be viewed as Rambaud (2012:101) states; the listener assumes that a speaker will have calculated his/her utterance along with a number of parameters, s/he will tell the truth, try to estimate what his/her audience knows and package his/her material accordingly, have some idea of the current topic, and give some thought to his/her audience being able to understand him/her. For example;

(24) A: Did you bring me the CDs I asked for?

B: The store was closed.

The implied meaning in the example above is "No".

There is no connection between the two statements but the first speaker will understand that the answer is no because of her world knowledge, which indicates that a probable place where the CDs can be obtained is a department store.

(25) A: Did you drink all the bottles of coke in the fridge?

B: I drank some.

Here the implied meaning is that the second speaker did not drink them all.

Grice (1975:45) suggests that there is an accepted way of speaking which we all accept as standard behaviour. When we produce, or hear, an utterance, we assume that it will generally be true, have the right amount of information, be relevant, and will be couched in understandable terms. If an utterance does not appear to conform to this model, then we do not assume that the utterance is nonsense; rather, we assume that an appropriate meaning is there to be inferred (Davies 2000:2). Speakers can convey their intentions by a limitless number of utterances, it is up to the hearer to calculate the utterer's intention.

To observe all the maxims in one simple conversation, Kubota (1995:36) provides an example;

(26) A: Where's the steak?

B: The dog looks happy.

As seen, B implicates that the dog probably ate it and the analysis should be as follows;

i. The maxim of quantity:

This sentence is not informative at all for the current purpose of the exchange, since B does not directly tell the location of the steak.

ii. The maxim of quality:

This maxim is acceptable in this dialogue, since it seems that B utters the true information of the scene that B watched.

iii. The maxim of relevance:

It appears that the location of the steak in A's utterance and the feeling of the dog in B's utterance are not related. B's utterance

never becomes the direct answer to A's question. Therefore, the dialogue breaks the maxim of relevance.

iv. The maxim of manner:

The dialogue follows the maxim of manner, because it avoids unnecessary prolixity and ambiguity. Hence, the dialogue breaks the maxims of quantity and relevance.

The four conversational maxims can also be examined by Thomas (1995:64) by using the following example;

(27) Husband: Where are the car keys?

Wife: They are on the table in the hall.

The wife has answered clearly (manner), truthfully (quality), has given just the right amount of information (quantity) and has directly addressed her husband's goal in asking the question (relation). She has said precisely what she meant, no more and no less, and has generated no implicature (i.e. there is no distinction to be made here between what she says and what she means, there is no additional level of meaning).

The conversational maxims are responsible for regulating normal conversation, however, each can be suspended in certain circumstances to create particular effects as O'Grady (1996:301) points: Firstly, the maxim of relation is crucial to evaluating the appropriateness of responses to the question "*Would you like to go to the cinema tonight?*". Because we assume that the conversational contributions of others are relevant to the topic at hand, we are able to infer from the response "*I have to study for an exam*" that the speaker is unable or unwilling to go to the movie. Similarly, because it is hard to see a connection between combing one's hair and being able to go to a movie, we judge the response "*I have to comb my hair*" to be irrelevant and hence inappropriate. Secondly, the maxim of quality requires that the statements used in conversations have some factual basis. If, for example, I ask "*What's the weather like?*" and

someone responds “*It’s snowing*”, I will normally assume that this statement provides reliable information about the current weather.

In order to achieve irony or sarcasm, however, it is sometimes possible to abandon the maxim of quality and say something that one knows to be false. Thus, if two people live in the middle of a sweltering desert and one person insists on asking every morning “*What’s the weather like?*”, it might be appropriate for the other person to respond sarcastically “*Oh, today it’s snowing, as usual*”, perhaps with a particular facial expression or intonation to indicate that the statement was not intended as a true report of the facts.

Then, the maxim of quantity introduces some very subtle guidelines into a conversation. If, for example, A asks B where a famous singer lives, the nature of B’s response will depend in large part on how much information B believes to be appropriate for that point in the conversation. If B knows that the other person is simply curious about which part of the country the singer lives in, it might suffice to respond “*in Chicago*”. On the other hand, if B know that A wants to visit the singer, then much more specific information (perhaps even an address) is appropriate. Finally, for the maxim of manner, for instance a speaker refers to a particular person as *the man whom Tina lives with*. A listener would be justified in concluding that the man in question is not Tina’s husband. This is because, by the maxim of manner, a briefer and less obscure description, *Tina’s husband*, would have been used if it could have correctly described Tina’s companion.

Since these maxims being unstated assumptions that exist in interactions and conversations, hearers have a tendency to think that speakers are telling the truth, giving appropriate information and trying to be relevant. Accordingly, the conversational maxims establish effective communication between the interlocutors and are considered to be the bridge between the utterances and what is interpreted from them. However, it is not always too easy to observe the maxims. Because in everyday language, people sometimes can

be insufficient or incapable in expressing themselves due to various reasons such as inadequate language competency, unwillingness or deliberately choosing to lie.

According to Thomas (1996:64-77), Grice was well aware that there are very many occasions when people fail to observe the maxims such as flouting a maxim, violating a maxim, infringing a maxim, opting out of a maxim and suspending a maxim. These occasions are listed below in detail;

a) Flouting a maxim

To flout a maxim may also be considered to violate it – but in this case the violation is so intentionally blatant that the hearer is expected to be aware of the violation (Birner 2013:42). If, after taking an exam, A tells B “*That exam was a breeze!*”, A clearly does not expect B to believe that A intended his utterance to be taken as literal truth, since an exam and a (literal) breeze are two completely distinct things. In the case of “*That exam was a breeze!*”, the assumption of overall cooperativity might lead the hearer to appeal to the maxim of relation and realize that the speaker’s intention was to attribute a relevant property of breezes (e.g., ease, pleasantness) to the exam.

For the flouting of a maxim (Thomas 1996:72), consider the following examples:

(28) Diana is asking Karen about Mary’s fiancée:

A: Is he nice?

B: She seems to like him.

B could simply have replied: “*No*”. This would give the maximum amount of information possible in the situation. Instead, B gives a much weaker and less informative response.

(29) B was on a long bus journey and wanted to listen to music with her headphones. A was a passenger who wanted to talk to her:

A: What do you do?

B: I'm a teacher.

A: Where do you teach?

B: Outer Mongolia.

A: Sorry I asked!

Outer Mongolia is seen as somewhere impossibly remote, so that B's improbable response prompted the hearer to look for an implicature. The funny thing about this example is that B really does teach in Outer Mongolia, but A is nevertheless correct in assuming that B is trying to give him the brush off.

(30) A: How are we getting there?

B: Well *we're* getting there in John's car.

B blatantly gives less information than A needs, thereby generating the implicature that, while she and her friends have a lift arranged, A will not be travelling with them.

b) Violating a maxim

To violate a maxim is to fail to observe it, but to do so inconspicuously, with the assumption that your hearer will not realize that the maxim is being violated. A straightforward example of this is a lie: The speaker makes an utterance while knowing it to be false (that is, a violation of quality), and assumes that the hearer won't know the difference. Violations of maxims are generally intended to mislead (Birner 2013:42). If a speaker violates a maxim, he will be liable to mislead the hearer.

(31) An English athlete pulled out of her opening race and returned to England. The press officer for the England team said:

She has a family bereavement; her grandmother died.

The next day it was announced that Dianne had been sent home following a positive test for drugs. What the press officer had said was true, but the implicature (that the reason for Dianne's returning home was a bereavement) was false (Thomas 1996:72).

Grice pointed out that these maxims are not always observed, but he makes a distinction between “quietly” violating a maxim and openly flouting a maxim (Peccei 1999:27). Violations are quiet in the sense that it is not obvious at the time of the utterance that the speaker has deliberately lied, supplied insufficient information, or been ambiguous, irrelevant or hard to understand. In Grice’s analysis, these violations might hamper communication but they do not lead to implicatures. What leads to implicatures is a situation where the speaker flouts a maxim. That is, it is obvious to the hearer at the time of the utterance that the speaker has deliberately and quite openly failed to observe one or more maxims.

c) Infringing a maxim

A speaker who, with no intention of generating an implicature and with no intention of deceiving, fails to observe a maxim is said to infringe the maxim (Thomas, 1995:72). In other words, the non-observance stems from imperfect linguistic performance rather than from any desire on the part of the speakers to generate a conversational implicature. This type of non-observance could occur because the speaker has an imperfect command of the language, because the speaker’s performance is impaired in some way such as nervousness or excitement or because the speaker is incapable of speaking clearly.

(32) A native speaker is talking to a non native speaker who is trying to learn the language.

A: Would you like tea or coffee?

B: Yes, please.

Here, it can be easily seen that B cannot interpret the utterance because of his insufficient language competency.

d) Opting out of a maxim

To opt out of the maxims altogether is, in a sense, to refuse to play the game at all (Birner, 2013:42). If A is trying to have an argument

with her husband and he responds by opening the newspaper and beginning to read, he has opted out. So, a speaker opts out of observing a maxim by indicating unwillingness to cooperate in the way the maxim requires (Thomas 1996:74). For example:

(33) A: I lived in a country where people sometimes need to flee that country.

B: Where was that?

A: It's a country in South America and I don't want to say any more.

(34) A: Tony is having an affair.

B: How do you know?

A: Because I know.

In the examples (33) and (34), A is not fully cooperating with B since he does not want to give the answer precisely as the nature of the conversation really requires.

e) Suspending a maxim

Finally, because of being highly culture specific in some societies, people sometimes may have a tendency to suspend a maxim within a conversation. Also in some cultures, some taboo words do not allow people to obey to the general rules of maxims.

The speakers do not observe the maxims, because there is no expectation on the part of any participant that they will be fulfilled (Bunina and Timoshenko, 2014:31). Instances of suspension of the maxims can be found in funerals, telegrams, phone calls, poetry, and jokes.

In a conversation, all four maxims may not be needed due to some overlaps among them (Griffiths, 2006:141). Consider the following example:

(35) A: Can anyone use this car park?

B: It's for customers of the supermarket.

In the example above, it can be understood that the implied meaning is “No”.

If the car park was for the use of everyone, then that would include the supermarket’s customers and there would be no need to mention them; so B’s utterance appears to offer superfluous information. An assumption that B is abiding by the quantity maxim – and therefore not giving more information than needed – invites an implicature that it is necessary to specify supermarket customers – it is for them and not for other motorists, which amounts to an informative negative answer to A’s question. Two features of implied meaning can be observed in (35). Firstly, the implied meanings provide ways of communicating indirectly, and indirectness can be employed for politeness. B’s answer is polite, whereas just saying “No” would have been rude. Secondly, being based on an implied meaning, - the “No” meaning conveyed by B’s answer is not guaranteed to be true; it could be overridden, for instance, by B adding “*but when it’s only half full, like today, we never make an issue over anyone else parking here*”.

For the overlap of maxims, consider the following situation as Peccei (1999:28) provides:

(36) Suppose you were considering A for a job that needed good writing skills. You have written to his English teacher asking her to assess his performance in this area. You receive the following reply:

“A has regularly and punctually attended all my classes. All his assignments were handed in on time and very neatly presented. I greatly enjoyed having A in my class.”

First of all, the teacher’s response appears to flout the maxim of quantity. There is insufficient information about A’s writing skills, yet we would assume that as his English teacher, s/he would have this information. Secondly, most people infer that A’s writing skills are not very good even though at no point is this explicitly stated. The teacher knows that s/he should give an informative answer to

the question (quantity). S/he also knows that s/he should only say what is truthful (quality). The teacher does not want to state simply that the student's performance was not very good. (For example, s/he might think that A will see the reference letter.) At the same time, s/he does not want to lie. So, s/he makes his/her response in such a way that the reader can infer this without him/her having to state it. According to Grice, the implicature is made possible by the fact that we normally assume that speakers do not really abandon the cooperative principle.

Grice calls the cooperative principle a rough general principle and the maxims are a tentative attempt to understand how human beings interact in conversation. The cooperative principle and the maxims seem to describe an ideal world of effective, rational, maximally cooperative conversational interaction (Benotti and Blackburn, 2014:425). But it is a mistake to dismiss Grice and conversational implicature on these grounds. Grice is not suggesting that all human conversational interactions live up to these principles, or even that it would be better if they did. Rather, Grice is trying to indicate the existence of deep-seated norms of conversational interaction. Humans are social beings, so they interact with the power of speech. Grice is tentatively suggesting that assumptions somewhat like the cooperative principle or the maxims must give way to this process. There are, of course, all sorts of other maxims (aesthetic, social, or moral in character), such as "Be polite," that are also normally observed by participants in talk exchanges, and these may also generate nonconventional implicatures (Grice 1989:28). The conversational maxims, however, and the conversational implicatures connected with them, are specially connected with the purposes that the exchange of talks is adapted to serve and is primarily employed to serve. Therefore, for a successful communication to take place, both interlocutors involved in a conversation should cooperate.

CHAPTER 4

IMPLICATURE AND INFERENCE

In a conversation, sometimes the hearer may have difficulties while trying to fully interpret what the speaker intends to mean, because people benefit from the characteristics of language use and this results in the implication of what is meant. However, it might not be so clear for the hearer to grasp the intended meaning. The hearer tries to establish a relationship between what s/he infers and what the speaker implies and this may not be as easy as it is thought. The hearer's interpretation and the speaker's implied meaning could be problematic for both sides as the speaker takes a risk by choosing the way of implication instead of saying it clearly. In that case, the message that the speaker wishes to convey may not be completely and correctly understood by the hearer. Nevertheless, sometimes this risk has to be taken because the implication of a meaning is more effective than it is being explicitly stated. Speakers convey information not only by what they say, but also what they do not say, but imply. This is a very common phenomenon that exists in all natural languages. Why do people choose implying instead of stating it clearly? In order to answer this question, the following examples should be examined first; what speakers say and what their words mean (Thomas, 1995:55). The following examples give an insight to the answer of this question:

(37) The following incident occurred at a seaside resort and was reported in some national papers.

Kent Coastguard reports that a girl, drifting out to sea on an inflatable set of false teeth, was rescued by a man on a giant inflatable lobster.

(38) “*We must remember your telephone bill*”, she said, hinting that Louise had talked long enough. “*Goodbye*”, said Louisa, ringing off. It takes the rich to remind one of bills, she thought.

(39) An ambulance man is sent to pick up an injured man on a Christmas evening. The injured man is drunk and vomits all over the ambulance man. The ambulance man utters:

“Great, that’s really great! That’s made my Christmas!”

In example (37) the reporter has written exactly what he means, neither more nor less. The speaker in example (38) means more than her words say; in uttering the words: “*We must remember your telephone bill*”, she is hinting that she wants to close the telephone conversation. In example (39) the ambulance man means exactly the opposite of what his words literally say. None of these situations is linguistically unusual; the most casual observation of people talking will produce similar examples. There are times when people say exactly what they mean, but generally they are not totally explicit. Since, on other occasions, they manage to convey far more than their words mean, or something quite different from the meaning of their words.

Additionally, Lafi (2008:1) stresses that it is common for people that in any kind of verbal interaction, speakers convey most of the communicational content by way of implication rather than by making overt statements. In fact, it is in the nature of communication itself that much of the total signification of utterances is communicated through implicit meaning. If a speaker makes his/her utterances entirely explicit, it will be so dull all the time. Implicitness is, thus, an essential feature of communication. It is this feature that makes communication both an interesting and a challenging enterprise.

Grice (1989:24) makes a very general distinction between what is said by a speaker and what s/he means or implicates. Suppose that A and B are talking about a mutual friend, C, who is now working in a bank. A asks B how C is getting on in his job, and B replies, “*Oh quite well, I think; he likes his colleagues, and he hasn’t been to prison yet.*” At this point, A might well inquire what B was implying, what he was suggesting, or even what he meant by saying that C had not yet been to prison. The answer might be any one of such things as that C is the sort of person likely to yield to the temptation provided by his occupation, that C’s colleagues are really very unpleasant and treacherous people, and so forth. It might, of course, be quite unnecessary for A to make such an inquiry of B, the answer to it being, in the context, clear in advance. It is clear that whatever B implied, suggested, meant in this example, is distinct from what B said, which was simply that C had not been to prison yet.

Therefore, the distinction between what is said and what is meant is significant because the speaker may mean something different from the words s/he utters.

In the sense in which Grice (1989:25) used the word *say*, he intended what someone has said to be closely related to the conventional meaning of the words he has uttered. Suppose someone to have uttered the sentence “*He is in the grip of a vice.*” Given a knowledge of the English language, but no knowledge of the circumstances of the utterance, one would know something about what the speaker had said, on the assumption that s/he was speaking standard English, and speaking literally.

Hence, what a speaker means goes beyond the meaning literally expressed by a particular utterance in communication (Moeschler, 2012:410). In ordinary talk such meanings are often treated as instances of implying (Haugh, 2015:41). The term “implicature” was coined by Grice (1975, 1989) in order to exclude the first sense of imply, which is traditionally used in logic and semantics

to refer to logical inferences and entailments of utterances. The term implicature is thus limited to the second sense of implying as expressing indirectly and so is generally contrasted with saying and what is said.

For the distinction between implicature and inference, Thomas (1995:58) emphasizes that to imply is to hint, suggest or convey some meaning indirectly by means of language. We have seen how this operates in example (38), where the speaker hints or indicates indirectly that she wants to end the telephone conversation; an implicature is generated intentionally by the speaker and may (or may not) be understood by the hearer. To infer is to deduce something from evidence. According to Gazdar (1980:38), an implicature is a proposition that is implied by the utterance of a sentence in a context even though that proposition is not a part of nor an entailment of what was actually said. An inference is produced by the hearer. Therefore, the speaker implies, the listener infers.

It is useful to distinguish between explicit and implicit information, and between implicit and implicated information (Tatu and Moldovan, 2012:2708). Explicit information is what a reader gathers only from the strict meaning of words. It rarely reflects the meaning of an utterance. Implicit information is built up from the explicit content of the utterance by conceptual strengthening or enrichment, which yields what would have been made fully explicit if lexical extensions had been included in the utterance. It is heavily dependent on the context of the situation. For example, consider the following conversation between the two interlocutors;

(40) A: Dinner's ready! Prawns, grouper in some sauce, vegetables, rice and shark's fin melon soup! Still waiting for lotus root soup this week!

B: Eee lotus root?

A: So what are you having for dinner?

Several facts are stated explicitly and their logical inferences can

easily be identified (the dinner is ready, a list of dishes where the ingredients of the soup include shark's fin and melon, lotus root soup for later in the week, A's question about what B will have for dinner). However, a rich body of implicated information is conveyed as well (A has prepared a dinner which includes the list of mentioned dishes; A is excited of having prepared this gourmet dinner, B dislikes lotus root and cannot believe that A would choose to eat it; A has a poor opinion of B's gastronomic knowledge).

These conversational implicatures are derived from cultural contexts. They go beyond the communication's semantic content, contrasting with its logical implications. In order to recognize them, communication participants rely on common sense knowledge gathered by observation of successful social interactions. More specifically, they make use of world knowledge about one's culture, about what is socially or ethically allowed in general as well as what are the expected reactions in a particular situation, and the use of language for cooperative interactions.

The main import of an utterance may, in fact, easily lie not with the thought expressed by the utterance (that is, with what is communicated directly) but rather with the thought(s) that the hearer assumes the speaker intends to suggest or hint at (Spencer-Oatey and Zegarac, 2002:78). More technically, it lies with what is implicated, or communicated indirectly.

People communicate, and in order to make their communications successful they need to cooperate (Mahmood, 2015:67). Cooperation among interlocutors in a communication is manifested in the implicatures and inferences. If the speaker and the hearer talk about different and unrelated issues explicitly or implicitly, miscommunication is expected in the end as a result. However, if they understood each other through the perfect match between the speaker's intended implicature and the hearer's generated inference, the conversation goals could be easily achieved and the communication would be marked successful.

Horn (2012:69) asserts that the distinction stressed above is vital for pragmatics because an interpreter may recover an implication that was not intended by the utterer, and a speaker may imply something that the interpreter cannot grasp.

In the preceding parts related to context and its role in the construction of meaning, it was indicated how listeners participate in the construction of meaning. One way of doing this is by using inferences to fill out the text to build up an interpretation of speaker meaning. According to Rambaud (2012:99), conversational inference and conversational implicature are ways of inferring meaning from a context.

On implicature and inference, the following example shows how the interpretation of an utterance works between the interlocutors;

(41) Father: Have you done your school assignments?

Daughter: I did Social Science and Geography.

Father: Great, how about English?

Daughter (goes extremely red and keeps silent).

Father: I am sure you will keep your promise with daddy and do all the assignments before you go to bed.

Daughter: I will, daddy.

In the dialogue, the father infers from his daughter's answer that she has not done her English assignments. He wants to certify his inference, therefore he asks her about English assignment. Her getting red and keeping silent supports and settles the father's generated inference as definitely true. Then, he reminds his daughter of her promise and the necessity of doing her English and other assignments before going to bed, something that the daughter validates with her follow-up answer (I will, daddy.). Thus, Mahmood (2015:69) points out that the same inference was generated and certified in three interrelated components of the conversation to make sure that both the father and the daughter are on the same

page. Ideally, implicature and inference are respectively the ways about how the speaker intends and in return how the hearer infers.

Based on his works on implicatures, Grice (1975) distinguished two sorts of implicature; namely, conventional implicature and conversational implicature. These two types of implicatures share in common the feature that they both convey an additional meaning. However, in conventional implicatures, the same implicature is always conveyed regardless of context. On the other hand, in conversational implicatures, what the speaker implies may change according to the context. For this reason, the forthcoming sections will try to flash on the differentiation between the two types of implicatures that Grice proposed.

4.1 Conventional implicatures

Conventional implicatures were briefly characterised by Grice as instances where the conventional meaning of the words used will determine what is implicated, besides helping to determine what is said (Grice, 1975, 1989). Drawing upon definitions of conventional implicature from Horn (1999:392) and Levinson (1983:127), Haugh (2015:48) defines them as implicatures that arise through non-truth-conditional and non-logical inferences, which are not constitutive of what is said nor calculable in any general way from what is said, but rather are attached by convention to particular lexical items or expressions. Common examples of conventional implicature include the implication of contrast associated with the use of *but*, the implication of something being contrary to expectations associated with *even*, and the implication that the present situation is expected to be different, or perhaps the opposite at a later time associated with *yet*. Likewise, for a few examples of conventional implicatures, Thomas (1995:57) adds some uses of *for*, as in: “*She plays chess well, for a girl.*” In this example, the implicature is that girls are not expected to play chess well and this can be deduced by the use of *for*.

Meaning is defined as a conventional meaning in Davies' (2000:16) study. So, words are said to have conventional meanings. In terms of implicatures, conventional meaning is conceptually prior to an implicature. So, it is essential for a sentence to have a conventional meaning before it can trigger an implicature. Conventional implicatures are triggered by the socially-fixed meanings of particular words. Therefore, they should fit neatly within the logical framework; they are entirely predictable.

In fact, conventional implicatures are not based on the cooperative principle or the maxims. They do not have to occur in conversation, and they do not depend on special contexts for their interpretation. Like lexical presuppositions, conventional implicatures are associated with specific words and they result in additional conveyed meanings when those words are used (Yule 1996:45). To illustrate, the specific words used in conventional implicatures can be exemplified in the following examples;

(42) The chair woman is thirty eight, but still charming.

In the above example, it would be fairly easy to guess the second part of the utterance due to the nature of the word *but*. Because what comes next after *but* will run counter to expectations regardless of the context in which it occurs.

Yule (1996:45) proposes that the interpretation of any utterance of the type *p but q* will be based on the conjunction *p & q* plus an implicature of contrast between the information in *p* and the information in *q*. In (43a), the fact that "Ruth suggested black" (=p) is contrasted, via the conventional implicature of *but*, with my choosing white (=q) and +> shows the implicature.

(43a) Ruth suggested black, but I chose white.

(43b) *p & q* (+>*p*) is in contrast to *q*

Despite their status as context-independent, however, conventional implicatures are non-truth conditional (Birner, 2013:67). Consider the following example;

(44) Daisy is a Labrador retriever, but she is very friendly.

The indicated example is true precisely when it is true that (45a) Daisy is a Labrador retriever and (45b) she is very friendly, and false in all other cases. The fact that Labradors are almost always friendly – and thus that the conventional implicature of contrast does not hold – has no bearing on the truth of the utterance. To put it another way, suppose the following three propositions are true:

(45a) Daisy is a Labrador retriever.

(45b) Daisy is very friendly.

(45c) There is a contrast between being a Labrador retriever and being friendly.

In this case, “*Daisy is a Labrador retriever, but she is very friendly*” is true. Now consider the case where all Labradors are friendly – that is, in the case where (45c) is false; in this case, the utterance is still true. Compare this with the situation that would hold if, say (45a) were false – if, say, Daisy were a cocker spaniel. In that case, the entire utterance in (44) is rendered false. Thus, the meaning in (45a) constitutes part of the truth-conditional meaning of the utterance in (44). Since the truth of (45c) has no effect on the truth of the utterance in (44), it is an implicature; since it is conventionally attached to the use of the word *but*, it is a conventional implicature.

An example of a word that explicitly demonstrates the difference between what is said and what is conventionally implicated is *even* (Karttunen and Peters 1979:11).

(46) Even Henry likes Kate.

To say it still another way, as far as the truth-conditional aspects of meaning are concerned, (46) and (47) are equivalent; they express the same proposition.

(47) Henry likes Kate.

It is clear, of course, that the presence of *even* in (46) contributes something to the meaning of the sentence. One is entitled to infer from (46) not just that Henry likes Kate but also what is expressed by the sentences in (48).

(48a) Other people besides Henry like Kate .

(48b) Of the people under consideration, Henry is the least likely to like Kate.

By asserting (46) the speaker commits himself to (48a) and (48b) just as much as to (47). If it should happen that (48a) or (48b) is false while (47) is true, the speaker can justly be criticized for having a wrong idea of how things are. Interestingly enough, though, such criticism would normally be rather mild, usually crediting the speaker with saying something that is partially correct. A response to (46) in such circumstances might run “*Well yes, he does like her; but that is just as one should expect.*” In the contrasting situation, where (47) is false, partial credit would not normally be given even if (48a) and (48b) were true. One would hardly reply to an assertion of (46) in this situation with “*Yes, you wouldn’t expect Henry to like Kate; as a matter of fact, he doesn’t like her.*”

When *even* is included in any sentence describing an event, there is an implicature of contrary to expectation (Yule 1996:45). Thus, in (49) there are two events reported (i.e. Danny’s coming and Danny’s helping) with the conventional implicature of *even* adding a contrary to expectation interpretation of those events.

(49a) Even Danny came to the party.

(49b) He even helped tidy up afterwards.

The conventional implicature of *yet* is that the present situation is expected to be different, or perhaps the opposite, at a later time. In uttering the statement in (50a), the speaker produces an implicature that she expects the statement “*George is here*” (= p) to be true later, as indicated in (50b).

(50a) George isn't here yet. (= NOT p)

(50b) NOT p is true (+> p expected to be true later)

For many people dealing with linguistics, the notion of implicature is one of the key concepts in pragmatics since an implicature is definitely a typical example of more being communicated than is said.

The meaning of a sentence conventionally determines, or helps to determine, what is literally said by uttering the sentence; for example, the meaning of the sentence "*I have not had breakfast today*" determines that, if the speaker utters the sentence on a certain day, what s/he thereby says is that s/he has had no breakfast on that day. Conversational implicatures are part of what the utterance communicates, but they are not conventionally determined by the meaning of the sentence; they are pragmatically rather than semantically determined. For example, in saying that s/he has had no breakfast, the speaker may convey to his/her addressee that s/he is hungry and wishes to have something to eat. As Grice pointed out, the generation of conversational implicatures can be accounted for by connecting them with certain general principles or maxims of conversation that participants in a talk-exchange are mutually expected to observe. In the Gricean framework, conversational implicatures are contextual implications of the utterance act, they are the assumptions that follow from the speaker's saying what s/he says together with the presumption that s/he is observing the maxims of conversation (Recanati, 1989:295).

Grice is aware that what is said depends not only on the conventional meaning of the words but also on the context of utterance. What is said by uttering "*I have not had breakfast today*" depends on who is speaking and when. This is why there is a difference between the conventional meaning of words and what is said by uttering the words. The conventional meaning of the words determines, or helps to determine, what is said, but it cannot be identified with what is said.

Conventional implicatures as Levinson (1983:127) notes, are non-truth conditional inferences that are not derived from pragmatic principles like the maxims, but are simply attached by convention to particular lexical items or expressions.

Whereas semantics studies the literal meaning of an expression, the subject of pragmatics is what and how speakers communicate by using that expression. In other words, semantics is more tied to the conventional aspects of linguistics meaning as encoded in the lexicon, while pragmatics deals with the conversational aspects of speaker meaning in concrete discourse contexts (Gutzmann, 2014:4). The difference between conventional and conversational meaning is illustrated clearly by irony as in “*Tony is so smart!*” By the conventions of English, this utterance expresses an evaluation of Tony as being smart. However, if verbalized when Tony just realized that he forgot his keys and hence cannot get back into his apartment, the utterance can conversationally convey the contrary.

As noted earlier, it is a defining feature of implicatures that they do not affect the truth conditions of the sentence. Thus, according to Birner (2013:66), any non-truth conditional aspect of an utterance’s meaning may be considered an implicature. Moreover, as we have seen in the previous sections, conversational implicatures are defined by their context-dependence. That is, a conversational implicature is calculated on the basis of the linguistic expression uttered, the context in which it was uttered, and the conversational maxims Grice proposed.

4.2 Conversational implicatures

The second type of implicatures is the conversational implicature and unlike the conventional one, it is definitely dependent on the context. In addition to background beliefs, the setting, and the discourse context, there is at least one other major type of information that enters into the interpretation of utterances (O’Grady, 1996:300).

This information has to do with the rules for conversation, our understanding of how language is used in particular situations to convey a message. If, for example, I ask someone, “*Would you like to go out tonight?*” and I receive as a response “*I have to look after my baby brother*”, I know that the other person is declining my invitation even though there is nothing in the literal meaning of the sentence that says so. Moreover, even though the response does not contain an explicit answer to my invitation, I recognize it as a perfectly appropriate way to respond.

As speakers of a language, we are able to draw inferences about what is meant but not actually said. Information that is conveyed in this way is referred to as a conversational implicature. The ease with which we recognize and interpret implicatures stems from our knowledge of how people in our linguistic community use language to communicate with each other. As a consequence, it would not be unwise to claim that the theory of conversational implicature has started to grow quickly with the spreading of pragmatics.

If both participants have the expectation to achieve a successful conversation, they must cooperate with each other, and speak sincerely, sufficiently, relevantly and clearly (Wang, 2011:1163). To put it another way, they must observe the cooperative principle and the maxims of quality, quantity, relevance and manner. In a conversation, the hearer should infer the speaker’s intended meaning in particular contexts. For example:

- (51) A: Do you know when Jerry left the pub last night?
B: Eleven o’clock. And he went to Carol’s apartment instead of his own.

According to the maxim of quantity, the contribution should not be more informative than is required. In this way, in the example, as the answer to A, generally, “*Eleven o’clock*”, is enough. However, B adds the later sentence which provides some information that seems not necessary and violates the maxim of quantity. We infer that B

wants to tell A that Jerry might have some special relationship with Carol. In typical linguistic exchanges, many things are expressed without being explicitly said.

The notion of conversational implicature is significant in recognizing and conveying a message in a conversation as Kubota (1995:36) points out. The listener tries to search for another possible meaning of the message that the speaker intends to convey when the literal meaning is not what the speaker intends. According to the Gricean scheme, which has been adopted for a long time by many people working in the field, semantics deals with meaning, basically conceived of as truth-conditional content, and pragmatics deals with (certain aspects of) interpretation. As Stokhof (2002:7) states, the case of conversational implicatures provides a nice illustration. The utterance is supposed to have a specific meaning, which somehow does not fit into the present conversation. Then pragmatics takes over and decodes the intended message, in terms of conversational implicatures.

In a conversation, the utterances produced by interlocutors have explicit and implicit meanings as stated before. The explicit meaning can be understood both by predicting the semantic meaning of words within a conversation and by knowing the syntactic structure of the language used in a conversation. On the other hand, to understand the implicit meaning in a conversation the rules of semantics and the syntactic structure of the language are insufficient.

Therefore, according to Bunina and Timoshenko (2014:31), conversational implicature refers to a kind of extra meaning that is not literally contained in the utterance. It is a meaning different from the meaning in semantics as the meaning in semantics is the literal meaning of a word or a sentence. For example, “*Have you read today’s paper?*” just means that the speaker wants to know if the listener has read the paper or not. The meaning in pragmatics is totally different. So, the sentence mentioned above can mean “*Please,*

pass the paper to me since you have read it". When the meaning in semantics and the meaning in pragmatics are the same, we are dealing with conventional implicature and when they are different, conversational implicatures take precedence.

Conversational implicature arises from the shared presumption that speaker and hearer interact to reach a shared goal. A speaker saying *p* and implicating *q* counts on his/her interlocutor's ability to compute what was meant from what was said, based on the assumption that both speaker and hearer are rational agents (Horn, 2012:74). On Grice's view, speakers implicate, hearers infer; such inferences may or may not succeed in recovering the speaker's intended implicature(s), if any. Nevertheless, it is the speaker's assumption that the hearer will draw the appropriate inference that makes implicature a rational possibility. Gauker (2001:166) discusses that it is not at all easy to define the concept of what is said. In lots of ways a person's actual words may fall short of an eternal sentence, interpretable as expressing a definite proposition on the basis of lexicon and syntactic structure alone irrespective of the context of utterance.

Benotti and Blackburn (2014:2) present an example from Grice (1975:51):

(52) A is standing by his car.

A: I am out of petrol.

B: There is a garage round the corner.

The utterance made by B would not have been relevant (to the conversational exchange) if B knew that the garage was closed or that it had run out of petrol. If B is a local person who knows about local garages, it is thus reasonable to assume that B is directing the man standing by the car to a garage that is open and currently selling petrol. That is, according to Grice, during the exchange, B made the following conversational implicature: "The garage is open and has petrol to sell."

Conversational implicature involves highly contextualized inferences that draw on multiple sources of information. For instance, in the example (52), presumably the visual information provided by A standing beside his stationary car plays an important role in initiating the exchange. As mentioned earlier, conversational implicatures are highly contextualized inferences, capable of exploiting multiple information sources. Again in the example (52), an assumed common knowledge context is significant; both A and B need to share the knowledge that petrol can be bought at open garages which have not run out of petrol. Secondly, this example draws on the situational context, most obviously on B knowing that the garage is around the corner and A can walk there. But a lot also hinges on the fact that we are in a conversational context. It is quite obvious that the implicature could not have been triggered without considering the immediate conversational context; if A had said “*Where do you come from?*” instead of “*I am out of petrol*”, B’s implicature would have been quite different. But even more basic components of the interaction context are crucial: A and B take for granted that the other is a language user, with intentions and goals, who may be prepared to take part in a cooperative exchange in order to overcome undesired states such as being out of petrol. Conversational implicature is a big share of the meaning conveyed by goal seeking, linguistically competent agents when they interact in contexts.

An important contribution made by the notion of implicature as Levinson (1983:97) asserts is that it provides some explicit account of how it is possible to mean (in some general sense) more than what is actually said (i.e. more than what is literally expressed by the conventional sense of the linguistic expressions uttered). For example:

(53) A: Can you tell me the time?

B: Well, the milkman has come.

All that we can reasonably expect a semantic theory to tell us about this minimal exchange is that there is at least one reading that we might state as follows:

(54) A: Do you have the ability to tell me the time?

B: (pragmatically interpreted particle), the milkman came at some time prior to the time of speaking.

Yet it is clear to native speakers that what would ordinarily be communicated by such an exchange involves considerably more, along the lines of the italicized parts below:

(55) A: Do you have the ability to tell me the time *of the present moment, as standardly indicated on a watch, and if so please do tell me.*

B: *No I don't know the exact time of the present moment, but I can provide some information from which you may be able to deduce the approximate time, namely the milkman has come.*

Clearly the whole point of the exchange is a request for specific information and an attempt to provide as much of that information as possible which is not directly expressed in (54) at all; so the gap between what is literally said in (54) and what is conveyed in (55) is so substantial that we cannot expect a semantic theory to provide more than a small part of an account of how we communicate using the language. The notion of implicature promises to bridge the gap by giving some account of how at least large portions of the italicized parts in (55) are effectively conveyed.

The speaker passes the implicated meanings, and if the hearer receives and perceives it, he could form inferences out of them (Mahmood, 2015:68). Consider the following short dialogue.

(56) Wife: I can't find my keys.

Husband: They are on the key holder behind the entrance door.

Wife: Oh, you are right. Thanks dear.

Husband: You are welcome, darling.

In the dialogue, the wife makes a statement about the keys that she cannot find. The husband takes a turn and states that they are on the key holder behind the entrance door. Considering the follow-up response by the wife for the husband's statement (They are on the key holder behind the entrance door) maintains the wife's satisfaction with his response, because the wife's first statement was rather an inquiring implicit act of questioning about where the keys might be, and the husband's response was to the point. Observing the output, one can see the conversation between them successful as the speaker (the wife) could have implicated other meanings, such as (accusing the husband of hiding the keys, suggesting going to work together by the husband's car, having no option for closing the door except shutting it, and others). The husband could have also similarly generated other inferences based on contextualized conversational implicatures.

Although implicatures might lead to miscommunication among the interlocutors, it is still mainly under the speaker's control to make the intended implicatures explicitly or implicitly, or fail to do that due to some factors, prominently including speaker's identification of the hearer and/or the context.

The basic assumption in conversation is that, unless otherwise indicated, the participants are adhering to the cooperative principle and the maxims (Yule 1996:40). In example (58), B may appear to be violating the requirements of the quantity maxim.

(57) A: I hope you brought the bread and the milk.

B: Ah, I brought the bread.

After hearing B's response in (57), A has to assume that B is cooperating and not totally unaware of the quantity maxim. But B did not mention the milk. If B had brought the milk, he would say so, because he would be adhering to the quantity maxim. So, B has conveyed more than he said via a conversational implicature. We can

represent the structure of what was said, with *b* (= bread) and *m* (= milk) as in (58).

(58) A: *b* & *m*?

B: *b* (+> NOT *m*)

It is important to note that it is speakers who communicate meaning via implicatures and it is listeners who recognize those communicated meanings via inference. The inferences selected are those which will preserve the assumption of cooperation.

In order to understand how conversational implicatures work, the following example can be observed: Suppose Nicole asks Scott “*Is Sarah coming to Brian’s party on Saturday?*”, and Scott replies “*Paul wants to go to a concert.*” On the face of it, this is a nonsense response to a simple question: Scott has declined to mention Sarah at all, and has instead brought up Paul and a concert, neither of which was being asked about. And yet this is a perfectly normal and satisfactory answer to the question: providing that Nicole knows that Paul is Sarah’s boyfriend, she can reason as follows: Scott does not know whether Sarah is coming to the party, or he would simply have told me, but Paul is Sarah’s boyfriend, and Scott tells me he wants to go to a concert; doubtless he will want Sarah to come with him, and the concert must be on Saturday, or Scott wouldn’t have mentioned it, and therefore I can conclude that Sarah will probably be going to the concert with Paul, and hence that she will not be coming to the party.

Nicole’s conclusion that Sarah probably won’t be coming to the party is an example of a conversational implicature (Trask, 1999:55). This conclusion has not been asserted by Scott, and it does not logically follow from what Scott has said, and yet it is reasonable, and Nicole will surely draw it.

The first key point here is the context of Scott’s utterance. Nicole knows that Paul and Sarah are a couple, and she knows that people like their partners to accompany them to social events, or at least that Paul does, and this contextual knowledge is crucial; without it,

Nicole would have little chance of making sense of Scott's response. This is typically the case with a conversational implicature; it can only be drawn by a hearer who has an adequate knowledge of the context. A second key point is that Nicole assumes that Scott is being cooperative. If Scott had known for certain that Sarah was or was not coming to the party, Nicole would have expected him to say so, and failure to do this would be uncooperative. Moreover, Nicole has every right to assume that the concert in question must be on the Saturday; had it been on the Friday, Scott's behaviour would have been very uncooperative indeed, not merely irrelevant but positively misleading. Nicole therefore assumes that Scott is cooperating, and draws her conclusion accordingly.

Grice's conversational implicatures are oriented towards everyday conversation where people often convey information that goes beyond the literal meaning of the language used. What is said is closely related to the conventional meaning of the words uttered, and what is conversationally implicated can be inferred from an utterance made in context (Slocum, 2016:27). What is conversationally implicated is not coded but, rather, is inferred on the basis of assumptions concerning the cooperative principle and its constituent maxims of conversation, which describe how people interact with each other.

Based on Grice's theories regarding implicature and inference, speaker meaning is divided into two categories; what is said and what is implicated. What is implicated may be either conventionally or conversationally implicated, and what is conversationally implicated may be due to either a generalized or a particularized conversational implicature.

Grice was the first to systematically study the ways how a speaker meaning differs from a speaker utterance. Therefore, his theory of conversational implicature places a great deal of emphasis on linguistics, especially pragmatics. The following section will

try to focus on two distinct sorts of conversational implicature; namely generalized conversational implicature and particularized conversational implicature.

4.2.1 Generalized conversational implicatures

Sometimes one can say that the use of a certain form of words in an utterance would normally (in the absence of special circumstances) carry such an implicature or type of implicature. Noncontroversial examples are perhaps hard to find since it is all too easy to treat a generalized conversational implicature as if it were a conventional implicature (Grice 1989:37). In other words, generalized conversational implicatures can be inferable regardless of a special context.

Grice (1989) did not develop the notion of a generalized conversational implicature to any great extent. When he introduces the terminology in his paper “Logic and conversation”, he gives a few examples of the following sort:

(59) A man came to my office yesterday morning.

(60) Tim found a rabbit in a garden.

(61) Susan broke a finger last night.

In the case of (59) the hearer would be surprised to discover that the man was the speaker’s husband, for the use of the indefinite noun phrase “a man” implicates that the speaker is not intimately related to the man (Bezuidenhout and Morris, 2004:258). Similarly, in (60) we assume that neither the rabbit nor the garden was Tim’s own, for if they were, the speaker would surely have used the expressions “his rabbit” and “his garden”. On the other hand, the use of an indefinite noun phrase does not always implicate the lack of an intimate relation between the subject and the thing indicated by the noun phrase. In the case of (61) there is an implicature that it was Susan’s own finger that Susan broke.

By considering the examples above, a generalized conversational implicature is generally attached to the form, and therefore does not need to be calculated according to a certain situational context.

In addition, sometimes no special background knowledge of the context of utterance is required in order to make the necessary inferences (Yule 1996:40). The same process of calculating the implicature will take place if A asks B about inviting her friends Brenda (= *b*) and Cindy (= *c*) to a party, as in the following example:

(62) A: Did you invite Brenda and Cindy? (*b & c*?)

B: I invited Brenda. (*b +> NOT c*)

When no special knowledge is required in the context to calculate the additional conveyed meaning, it is considered to be a generalized conversational implicature. One common example in English involves any phrase with an indefinite article of the type “a/an+noun”, such as “a rabbit” and “a garden” as in (60). These phrases are typically interpreted according to the generalized conversational implicature that: *a/an+noun +> not speaker’s noun*. Consider the example below:

(63) I was sitting in a garden yesterday. A child looked over the fence.

The implicatures in (63), the garden and the child, are not the speaker’s. So, they are calculated on the principle that if the speaker was capable of being more specific (i.e. more informative, following the maxim of quantity), then he would have said “my garden” and “my child”.

A generalized conversational implicature identifies a class of sentences based on their possession of a certain structural feature, and, given a sentence which has that feature, provides a way to arrive at the proposition which is said to be a generalized implicature of that sentence (Speaks 2008:115). It seems clear that any plausible candidates for generalized conversational implicatures must have

this characteristic. After all, generalized implicatures are supposed to arise independently of special features of the context of utterance; it is precisely this feature which makes them plausibly applicable to uses of language in thought.

4.2.2 Particularized conversational implicatures

In contrast to the generalized implicatures discussed above, particularized conversational implicatures are unique to the particular context in which they occur. They are implicatures that arise because of some special factor inherent in the context of utterance and are not normally carried by the sentence used as Gazdar (1980:38) points out. A particularized implicature can only be interpreted according to a specific context unlike a generalized conversational implicature which does not take into account any contextual factors.

(64) A: Have you seen my diary?

B: Terry is drawing something.

In the above short exchange, A will most likely get the implicature “Terry has the diary” by considering B’s utterance. Because A has easily inferred the truth about his diary by simply relying on the particular context.

Grice (1989:37) formulated a particularized conversational implicature as cases in which an implicature is carried by saying that *p* on a particular occasion in virtue of special features of the context, cases in which there is no room for the idea that an implicature of this sort is normally carried by saying that *p*. Moreover, Birner (2013:63) argues that a particularized conversational implicature arises due to the interaction of an utterance with the particular, very specific context in which it occurs, and hence does not arise in the default case of the utterance’s use or the use of some more general class of utterances of which it is a member.

Some implicatures can be calculated without special knowledge of any particular context. However, most of the time, our conversations take place in very specific contexts in which locally recognized inferences are assumed. Such inferences are required to work out the conveyed meanings (Yule 1996:40). As an illustration, consider example (65), where B's response does not appear on the surface to adhere to relevance. (A simply relevant answer would be "Yes" or "No").

(65) A: Are you coming to the beach in the afternoon?

B: My physics exam is tomorrow.

In the above exchange, A will likely derive the implicature "B cannot come to the beach as he has to study for his exam" from B's utterance.

To make a distinction between a generalized conversational implicature and a particularized conversational implicature, it can be stated that the former is implicated without any reference to context whereas the latter requires specific contextual information to be implicated.

Scalar implicatures

A linguistic scale consists of a set of linguistic alternates, or contrastive expressions of the same grammatical category, which can be arranged in a linear order by degree of informativeness or semantic strength as Levinson (1983:133) describes. Such a scale will have the general form of an ordered set of linguistic expressions.

Certain information is always communicated by choosing a word which expresses one value from a scale of values. This is particularly obvious in terms for expressing quantity, as in the scales such as "all, most, many, some, few, none", where terms are listed from the highest to the lowest value (Yule 1996:41).

When producing an utterance, a speaker selects the word/s from the scale which is the most informative and truthful (maxims of quantity and quality) in the circumstances, as in (66).

(66) I've completed some of the required courses.

By choosing *some* in (66), the speaker creates an implicature (+> not all). This is one scalar implicature of uttering (66). The basis of scalar implicature is that, when any form in a scale is asserted, the negative of all forms higher on the scale is implicated. By considering the above mentioned scale of implicatures, in saying 'some of the required courses', the speaker also creates other implicatures (for example, +> not most, +> not many).

If the speaker goes on describing the required courses as in (67), we can identify some more scalar implicatures such as a scale "always, often, sometimes, occasionally, rarely, never".

(67) They're sometimes really difficult.

By using *sometimes* in (67), the speaker communicates, via implicature, the negative of forms higher on the scale of frequency (+> not always, +> not often).

Scalar quantifiers like *some* have two distinct interpretations as Huang and Snedeker (2009:1727) mention. Typically, sentences like (68) will imply that the child ate some but not all of the fish.

(68) Mother: Have you finished your fish?

Child: I ate some of it.

However, in some occasions, *some* can be used in a context that does not exclude the total set. By observing the child's utterance, we can conclude that he has not finished his fish completely and does not have any intentions to do so. Thus, the quantifiers *some* and *all* can be ordered on a scale with respect to the strength of the information that they convey. On this theory, the meaning of the weaker term *some* is consistent with all values greater than a lower boundary (*some* is greater than *none*) up through and including the maximum (*all*). However, *some* is typically interpreted as having an additional boundary which excludes referents which are compatible with all. This happens via a pragmatic inference, a scalar implicature.

For scalar implicatures, consider the utterance below:

(69) Some of the students did well in the test.

The literal meaning of (70) is that some, and perhaps all, of the students did well. In contrast, the intuitive interpretation, of course, is that not all the students did well. The latter interpretation can be based on the theory of a scalar implicature, the central notion of which is a contrast set, or linguistic expressions in salient contrast, which differ in informativeness (Slocum, 2016:29). Relevant to the interpretation of (69), on a scalar contrast set mentioned above, such that saying (69) implicates the rationale that the speaker would have chosen the stronger alternative if he was in a position to do so. Thus, for sets of alternatives, use of one (especially a weaker) implicates rejection of another (especially an otherwise compatible stronger alternative).

4.3 Properties of conversational implicatures

After explaining the implicature types, Grice (1975) claims that there are some features of conversational implicatures that distinguish them from the conventional ones and Sadock (1978:284) highlights these properties as conversational implicatures being calculable, cancellable, nondetachable, nonconventional, not carried by what is said and indeterminate whereas the conventional ones being noncalculable, noncancellable, detachable, conventional, carried by what is said and determinate. So, to explain in detail, conversational implicatures must possess the following features;

4.3.1 Calculability

The first distinguishing feature of conversational implicatures is that they are calculable as a result of a working out procedure. Some implicatures may be deduced through a process of reasoning since the addressee has to make some calculations to infer the speaker's intended meaning. In other words, it is possible for the hearer to

be able to figure out the implicature by going through some steps. Recall the ambulance man example (39) “*Great, that’s really great! That’s made my Christmas!*”, the same words may convey, in different circumstances, very different implicatures. The implicature conveyed in one particular context is not random, though. It is possible to spell out the steps a hearer goes through in order to calculate the intended implicature. To calculate the implicatures in the above utterance, one has to follow the deductive process suggested by Thomas (1995:67):

- i. The ambulance man has expressed pleasure at having someone vomit over him.
- ii. There is no example in recorded history of people being delighted at having someone vomit over them.
- iii. I have no reason to believe that the ambulance man is trying to deceive us any way.
- iv. Unless the ambulance man’s utterance is entirely pointless, he must be trying to put across some other proposition.
- v. This must be some obviously related proposition.
- vi. The most obviously related proposition is the exact opposite of the one he has expressed.
- vii. The ambulance man is extremely annoyed at having the drunk vomit over him.

So, in order for the addressee to arrive at such interpretations, he has to go through the above mentioned steps.

The basic idea of such a derivation is best illustrated with a simple dialogue (Meibauer, 2009:366). Imagine that A asks his colleague B “*Has Nancy arrived yet?*” and B answers “*There is a red BMW in the parking lot.*” Understood literally, such an answer does not make any sense and seems irrelevant. However, as A assumes that his colleague is cooperative, and remembering that Nancy drives a red BMW, A can easily figure out that Nancy has arrived. In working out this information, A has made use of the assumption

that B's answer has been relevant with regard to A's question. Thus, conversational implicatures display the property of calculability.

The conversational implicature of an utterance is different from its literal meaning. There is no direct link between the two as Wang (2011:1163) claims. So if it is to succeed as the speaker intends to, there must be ways for the hearer to work it out. It is after such a process that an implicature is calculated by a hearer and then the proper interpretation is possible. Therefore, conversational implicatures are calculable and conventional ones are not since the meaning can be concluded from the words.

4.3.2 Cancellability

Conversational implicatures are defeasible without contradiction. Grice (1989:39) proposes that an implicature can be cancelled in a particular case. It may be explicitly cancelled, by the addition of a clause that states or implies that the speaker has opted out, or it may be contextually cancelled, if the form of utterance that usually carries it is used in a context that makes it clear that the speaker is opting out. Because they do not contribute to the truth conditions of the utterance. This property is perhaps the most significant difference between semantic meaning and the implied meaning. It suggests that an implicature can be denied, which allows the speaker to imply something and then deny that implicature as Thomas (1995:82) claims. Consider the following example:

(70) A and B are close friends. A is meeting his girlfriend in a few hours and calls his friend:

A: Did you get your car from the mechanic?

B: You cannot have it.

A: I don't want to. I just wondered if you'd had it back.

B: You just wondered!

A: Well, my sister had my car today!

In the example above, A denies the implicature of his first question. However, when his friend challenged he backs down and instead offers a justification for his implied request.

The following is another example:

(71) Son: Can I go out to play football?

Mother: You haven't finished your homework yet.

In the above short dialogue, the son infers from his mother's utterance that he could go out and play football after he finishes his homework.

After a while, the son asks his mother again after he finishes his homework:

Son: Mom, I have finished my homework, can I go now?

Mother: I didn't say that you could go out to play football after you finish your homework. I only said that you couldn't go before.

Here, the son infers from his mother's utterance that he can go out to play football. On the contrary, his mother's implicature turns out to be a denial.

Yule (1996:44) asserts that all the implicatures considered have been situated within conversation, with the inferences being made by people who hear the utterances and attempt to maintain the assumption of cooperative interaction. Because these implicatures are a part of what is communicated and not said, speakers can always deny that they intended to communicate such meanings. Therefore, conversational implicatures are deniable.

Besides, an implicature may just disappear (or not arise at all) in a context where it is clear both to the speaker and the addressee that such an inference could not have been intended. Implicatures are thus defeasible according to Lafi (2008:12) and can drop out in certain linguistic and nonlinguistic contexts.

Implicatures dependent on context such as conversational ones are most likely to be cancelled whereas implicatures dependent on lexical items such as conventional ones are less likely to be defeasible.

4.3.3 Nondetachability

Nondetachability is the third feature of conversational implicatures. As implicatures are attached to the semantic content of what is said rather than the linguistic expressions involved, it seems impossible for a conversational implicature to detach it from the utterance by any way of replacing a word or phrase with another or paraphrasing the sentence. No matter what the speaker does to change the structure of the sentence, the same implicature remains and still goes through.

As Wang (2011:1163) stresses, the conversational implicature is not attached to the linguistic form used. Therefore it is possible to use a synonym and keep the implicature intact. In other words, the implicature will not be detached, separated from the utterance as a whole, even though the specific words may be changed. Moreover, Thomas (1995:78) underlines some aspects of meaning are semantic and can be changed or removed by relexicalization or reformulation (replacing one word or phrase with another closely-related one, but lacking the supposedly unpleasant connotation). For example;

(72) Speaker A is a newly-widowed woman who finds living with her interfering mother a strain;

A: I wish you wouldn't creep up on me, Mother.

B: I don't creep, dear. I merely refrain from making gratuitous noise.

Or a speaker tries to relexicalize the expressions such as *"It's not a bribe, it's an offer"* or *"I'm not lying, I'm just being economical with the truth"*.

Replacing the offending lexical item with a synonym which does not have such negative connotations removes the unpleasantness.

This is not possible with implicature. No matter how much you reword an utterance, the implicature still remains.

(73) For example, suppose that your friend's 5-year-old boy is very naughty and you feel discomfort and you can use the utterances;

(73a) What a lovely boy!

(73b) An adorable kid!

(73c) What a cute little man!

No matter what is uttered, the same implicature will remain since all the utterances lead to the same interpretation. The speaker's attitude about the disobedient child does not change regardless of the change in the word order or the opposite connotations.

In other words, conversational implicatures are by necessity nondetachable from the content of whatever the utterance gives rise to them. What this means is that if an utterance of a sentence with a particular content generates an implicature in a given conversational context, then the utterance of any other sentence with the same content will give rise to the same implicature (Simons, 2013:333). Consider the short exchange in (74):

(74) Isabel: Would you like to go out for dinner?

Rose: I need to finish writing my research paper.

In the context of Isabel's question, Rose's utterance generates the implicature that she does not want to go out for dinner. However, the generation of the implicature is not dependent upon the form of Rose's utterance. Any other form which expresses more or less the same content will do just as well to produce the implicature. The responses in (75) are all possible candidates.

(75a) I have to finish my research paper.

(75b) My research paper needs to get finished tonight.

(75c) I need to work on my research paper.

Conversational implicatures are nondetachable because they are due to the expression of a particular content in a particular conversational content. They are not conventionally associated with any expression, so naturally we do not expect that the expression of the same content in a different form will affect the implicature.

By taking into account the above mentioned examples, it can be stated that in conversational implicatures, the implicature cannot be detached from the content of the utterance by simply changing the syntactic form of the utterance.

4.3.4 Nonconventionality

As conventional implicatures are attached to the conventional meaning of the words in a sentence, they are thought to be conventional. However, conversational implicatures are not part of the conventional content of an utterance. That is to say, the addressee first of all has to comprehend the literal meaning of the utterance, then s/he can have the interpretation of the implied meaning.

Conversational implicature is an extra meaning and it is not inherent in the words used. One cannot find conversational implicature listed in the dictionary due to its dynamic nature. To work out the conversational implicature of an utterance, one needs to know its conversational meaning and the context in which it is used (Wang, 2011:1163). That is, a conversational implicature is the adding up of the conventional meaning and the context. When the context changes, the implicature will also change aptly.

It is possible for an utterance to be true even if its implicature is false, and vice versa as in the following example as Lafi (2008:14) observes:

(76) Doris hit Tom .

(77) Doris didn't kill Tom by hitting him.

For if Doris had killed Tom by hitting him, to say just (76) would in fact be to withhold information in a non-cooperative way.

But then a speaker may, with an intention to mislead the addressee, say (76) even in a situation where (76) is true and (77) is false. The additional information (subtly) incorporated in the implicature (77) is thus not a part of the conventional meaning of the utterance (76). The example here seems to violate the maxim of quantity since the speaker is uncooperative with the hearer by not providing sufficient information if Doris had killed Tom.

A single expression used in two different contexts might convey two different conversational implicatures, but will always carry the same conventional implicature. Nonconventionality is the property that guarantees that changing the context in which a given expression is uttered has the potential to change the conversational implicature(s) it gives rise to. Birner (2013:68) argues that if the implicature were conventional – that is, if it were conventionally attached to the linguistic expression in question – it would be impossible to change it by changing the context in which that expression is uttered.

4.3.5 Saying

Conversational implicatures are not carried by what is said, but by the saying of it. The fifth property of conversational implicatures is related to saying. Grice (1989:39) notes that since the truth of a conversational implicature is not required by the truth of what is said (what is said may be true - what is implicated may be false), the implicature is not carried by what is said, but only by saying of what is said, or by putting it that way.

At first glance, this would appear to be at odds with nondetachability, which says that any other way of saying the same thing would carry the same implicature – which would seem that the implicature is indeed carried by what is said and not by putting it that way. (Birner, 2013:68). But what Grice means is that the implicature is not carried by the semantics (if it were, it would be conventionally attached to the semantics regardless of the context), but instead by

the speaker's decision to say what they have said, and to say it in that context. To clarify, consider Grice's example:

(78) A: Smith doesn't seem to have a girlfriend these days.

B: He has been paying a lot of visits to New York lately.

In the above exchange, the maxim of relation will lead A to infer that B means to implicate that Smith has a girlfriend in New York. The proposition expressed in B's statement could be true, yet the implicature could nonetheless be false; therefore it is not the proposition itself (what is said) that carries the implicature. Consider, for example, B knows that A knows that Smith has been paying a lot of visits to New York to visit his desperately-ill mother, the implicature might be entirely different. Thus, the implicature is not carried by semantics – what is said – but rather by the saying of it – that is, by the speaker's decision to say this thing at this point, for a certain implicature whose truth or falsity is not tied to the truth or falsity of the proposition expressed.

Conversational implicatures are the by-product of the meaning of a sentence, the cooperative principle, the conversational maxims, and the act of saying a particular sentence on a particular occasion (Moeschler, 2012:421). The pragmatic meaning of any expression in conversational implicatures (generalized or particularized) is therefore the result of the utterance act. Conventional implicatures are not dependant of this condition, because the implicature is attached to the word.

4.3.6 Indeterminacy

The final feature of conversational implicatures is that they are indeterminate. An expression with a single meaning can give rise to a different implicature on different occasions (Levinson, 1983:118). In other words, a specific content cannot be attached to an implicature for an utterance having a particular meaning. Consider for example:

(79) John's a machine.

This utterance could convey that John is cold, or efficient or never stops working. So implicatures can have a certain indeterminacy in at least some cases, in compatible with the stable determinate senses usually assumed in semantic theories.

Implicatures are the property of utterances, not of sentences, and therefore the same words carry distinct implicatures on various occasions as Thomas (1995:80) discusses. Consider the utterance “*How old are you?*” and how it is used in the three following examples:

(80) A young boy is talking to a friend of his father:

A: It’s my birthday today.

B: Many happy returns. How old are you?

A: I’m five.

(81) A is talking to his son about his inappropriate behavior:

A: How old are you, Frank?

B: I’m nineteen.

A: I know how old you are.

(82) A doctor is talking to a woman patient:

A: What do you do?

B: I’m a nurse, but my husband doesn’t let me work.

A: How old are you?

B: I’m thirty eight.

In each case the semantic meaning of “*How old are you?*” is the same; but the implicature is different. In example (80), it is a straightforward request for information; in example (81), the father is implying that the son’s behavior is inconvenient for a person of that age and the doctor in example (82) is probably trying to prompt the patient to consider whether, at thirty eight, she is not old enough to make up her own mind about whether or not to work.

An utterance might have different implicatures in various contexts. Hence, the most appropriate implicature should be determined according to the situation.

As opposed to conversational implicatures, Levinson (1983:128) concludes that conventional implicatures are noncancellable because they do not rely on defeasible assumptions about the nature of the context; they will be detachable because they depend on the particular linguistic items used; they will not be calculated using pragmatic principles and contextual knowledge, but rather given by convention; they may be expected, therefore, to have a relatively determinate content or meaning and there will be no expectation of a universal tendency for languages to associate the same conventional implicatures with expressions with certain truth conditions.

The six properties observed provide us with a set of tests for distinguishing conversational implicatures from conventional ones. Nevertheless, as Sadock (1978) proposes, not all the above mentioned tests are equally valuable and these conditions are neither required nor sufficient conditions for testing the implicatures. For example, nondetachability is not a property of manner implicatures since it depends not only on what is said but also on how it is said. The most reasonable test seems to be cancellability (Birner, 2013:68; Moeschler, 2012:421). On the contrary, when considered together, these properties can help us determine whether or not a certain piece of meaning that arises in a specific context constitutes a conversational implicature.

CONCLUSION

As it has repeatedly been indicated in the preceding chapters, meaning plays a vital role in a communication that takes place between the interlocutors. When meaning is considered, there is no clear distinction between what is implied and what is not; what is intentional and what is not; and what is inferred and what is not. That is why meaning has been an essential part of linguistics to be discussed, especially in the fields of semantics and pragmatics.

Although it is still under debate if it is possible to draw a clear-cut distinction between these two interrelated disciplines or not, the previous chapters have tried to shed some light to some points concerning semantics and pragmatics. Because of the turn taking procedures in an interaction, both interlocutors should consider the meaning in order to establish a smooth flow of conversation. However, broadly speaking, semantics focuses on the sentence meaning or the very first meaning that comes to mind whereas pragmatics mostly deals with what is meant. In other words, the addressee makes use of the former by relying on the words and sentences and what is literally meant while s/he takes into account the latter by interpreting the uttered words and sentences via making use of the context. So, context is the key element in pragmatics and it definitely helps the hearer a lot to get the intended meaning successfully. Sometimes the words people use may well transcend what these words literally say. Thus, the hearer/s should calculate the speaker meaning by moving

from the semantic meaning to pragmatic meaning. Keeping in mind the contextual factors such as place, time and social relationship between the interlocutors, what is really meant could be achieved thoroughly.

Other than the context mentioned in the study, identifying the relationship between a sentence and an utterance is another concern; an utterance is said to be the use of sentence by a particular speaker on a particular occasion while sentences carry literal meanings. Thus, for an interpretation, the hearer has to work out the speaker's utterance to construct a meaning. Furthermore, another significant distinction that has to be made is the one between a presupposition and an entailment. Both terms are central to semantics and pragmatics since a presupposition is related to an utterance and an entailment to a sentence.

To sum up, the first two chapters of the book have focused on meaning and how it is studied in two major fields of linguistics; semantics and pragmatics. Also, the relationship between these two disciplines has been tried to identified by considering the notion of semantic meaning, pragmatic meaning, sentence, utterance, presupposition and entailment.

Chapter three is mostly dedicated to H. P. Grice who proposed the cooperative principle and the conversational maxims. When two people engage in a conversation, for the communication between them to occur and keep going smoothly, each should cooperate because of a conversation being a joint endeavour. The cooperative principle is basic and fundamental in that it governs conversational exchanges. It is a kind of agreement between the interlocutors/participants to work together in order for their interaction/conversation to be effective. Therefore, Grice (1975) asserted that people should obey to this cooperative principle and follow the conversational maxims for an efficient communication. Each participant is expected to contribute to what is required by

the accepted purpose of the conversation. Actually, the main idea behind this principle is that interlocutors should be helpful to each other as much as they can.

According to the conversational maxims (quality, quantity, relevance, manner), the speaker is assumed to tell the truth, be informative, be relevant and be perspicuous. These rules can be viewed as general rules. However, it is not always easy to observe the maxims. Due to various reasons, people may fail to observe them. As discussed in Chapter three in detail, in flouting a maxim, an intentional violation can be seen. In violating a maxim, the speaker tries to lie or mislead the hearer. Infringing a maxim occurs due to an incompetency of a language. In opting out of a maxim, the speaker is definitely not willing to cooperate with the hearer and finally suspending a maxim occurs because of some cultural reasons.

The following chapter deals with the terms referred to as implicature and inference. Basically, in a conversation, the speaker implies, the listener infers. Nevertheless, the distinction between “what is said” and “what the speaker means by saying it” must be identified well. Because sometimes the speaker may choose the way of uttering his/her words by conveying them implicitly. In this case, the hearer has to deduce the implied meaning. Or the same words may convey different interpretations on different occasions, so the inference has to be done with caution.

When implicatures are considered, Grice (1975) made a classification; conventional implicatures and conversational implicatures. As their names stand, both types convey an additional meaning, with a significant difference. In conventional implicatures, the same interpretation is deduced regardless of the context. So, they are said to be context-independent. On the other hand, in conversational implicatures, the hearer has to grasp the intended meaning for it may change completely according to the context. Moreover, when implicatures are taken into account, it seems

necessary to mention scalar implicatures. In scalar implicatures, there is a scale of values and some special information is conveyed by choosing a word for a value which takes a place on the scale. A typical scale can be exemplified as “all, most, many, some, few, none”.

There are some properties which distinguish conversational implicatures from the conventional ones (See Chapter 4). The first property is related to calculability. When a speaker implies something, the hearer has to make some calculations to arrive at the intended meaning. Therefore, conversational implicatures are calculable unlike the conventional ones. The second feature concerns cancellability or defeasibility. A conversational implicature can be explicitly cancelled by the speaker whereas a conventional implicature cannot. The speaker first may imply something and then can deny it. The third is related to nondetachability. Unlike conventional implicatures, conversational implicatures are nondetachable because no matter what the speaker does, the implicature remains constant. In other words, there is no use in changing the structure of the sentence or substituting the words with others; the same implicature remains. The next property is nonconventionality. According to this property, when the speaker makes an utterance, the hearer has to consider the literal meaning of the utterance in the first place. However, conversational implicatures are not part of the conventional content of the utterance. So, they are said to be nonconventional. The fifth is related to saying. Conversational implicatures are not conveyed by what is said, actually by the way of saying it. This feature cannot be observed in conventional implicatures since the implicature is obvious in the words. The last feature about the conversational implicatures is indeterminacy. A single meaning can cause different implicatures on different occasions. Therefore, conversational implicatures are said to be indeterminate while the conventional ones are determinate.

As a final remark, because people live in societies, they are in a permanent interaction with one another and they have to make use of a language. Yet, they may face a wide variety of challenges. The communication among the people has to be proper; if not, the speaker cannot simply express what s/he wants to utter and, in return, the hearer cannot get the intended meaning. Making use of a language in this way, most of the time requires a context. For the reason that the meaning may change from place to place, time to time and even from person to person, the context which falls under the domain of pragmatics is crucial. Furthermore, implicatures and inferences mostly depend on context, which makes them belong to pragmatics. Consequently, pragmatics is to be benefited from as much as possible. In this way, interlocutors cooperate in a conversation to achieve a shared meaning of utterances. On the grounds that we live in communities, we should work together for these meanings to be shared among us. Otherwise, miscommunications and misunderstandings arise due to the fact that the context provided can lead to a quite different implicature in each case, which would affect the flow of a conversation negatively.

It is inevitable that there might be misunderstandings in human interaction. That is why implicatures and inferences gain importance. There is an essential difference between what is said and what is implied. Due to various reasons, people choose the way of implying which cannot be expressed overtly. In this case, the hearers have no choice but to infer it in a great effort.

During the natural flow of conversations, people may use and face many forms of implicatures and inferences in everyday life. What a person means is determined by his/her intention. As the implicatures can be calculated and deduced, it will be easier for the hearer to get the correct interpretation if s/he makes use of the context precisely.

Conclusively, for our communication and interaction to be thorough, reliable and well supported, we should be able to analyze our exchanges such as what is implied, what is inferred, what is meant and/or what is interpreted. Because, for the sake of language use, let us never forget that we may face the following question in every moment of our lives: “What did they mean by that?”

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